CIRCULATED FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
JOINT PLANNING STAFF

SAGBR'S EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN - 1958

Report by the Joint Planning Staff

The Standing Group has requested comments on SAGBR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1958 to reach them not later than 18th November, 1957. These comments will be taken into account by the Standing Group prior to final approval of the Plan.

2. In anticipation of instructions we have examined the Plan. Our report is at Annex.

Recommendation

3. We recommend that if the Chiefs of Staff approve our report they should forward the draft signal at Appendix to Admiral Denny.

(Signed) D.H. FITZGERALD
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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, R.W.I.

* STAND 2155
@ SAGBR E.D.P. 1-57 as amended by SRAP/560/57 AG1220 PADD.

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SOUTH'S EMERGENCY DEFENCE PLAN - 1958

1. The aim of this paper is to examine and report on SAKUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1958 in order to provide guidance to the United Kingdom representative on the Standing Group.

THE PLAN

2. SAKUR has stated that there are insufficient changes in the overall concept of capability to justify a completely new Emergency Defence Plan for 1958. As such, the Plan issued certain amendments to the 1957 Plan.

3. In the covering letter to the amendments, he directs his subordinate commanders to improve their planning concerning forward-deployment plans of regular and part-time forces. At the same time they should take every opportunity to present evolutionary steps towards the military posture indicated in SAKUR's various Force Study 1958-1963.

PRINCIPAL CHANGES

1. The only significant change to SAKUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1958 affects the plans for atomic warfare.

5. A substitute annex deals in greater detail with the policy for planning and controlling the use of atomic weapons, the concept of atomic operations and the tactics of major subordinate regional commanders and air commanders. The responsibilities of these commanders authorized to release and to expand atomic weapons on pre-planned targets have been expanded.

5. SAKUR's Atomic Strike Plan now consists of:

(a) A Baseline Plan, directed against the enemy atomic delivery capability within SAKUR's area of responsibility.

(b) A Counter Radar Program of mobile attacks against certain radar and control centres.

(c) An Interdiction Program against targets whose destruction is likely to have a major impact on the movements of enemy forces.

Thereafter atomic delivery forces will be employed on further, attacks on additional enemy atomic threats in support of the land and sea forces.

OUR VIEW

7. We are generally in agreement with SAKUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1958, which has been made part of the growing

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Annex (Concluded)

nuclear capability of his Command. We have two observations on his force requirements from the United Kingdom.

Canberra Light Bomber Force

6. The Canberra light bomber force was included in the list of atomic delivery forces by SACEUR in his Emergency Defence Plan for 1957, although the force had no nuclear capability. The latter is reflected in SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan, where the Bomber Command Canberras are allocated to targets suitable for attack only by conventional weapons. We assume that on realising the error in the 1957 SEP SACEUR deleted from his Emergency Defence Plan for 1958 the Canberra light bombers from the list of forces having an atomic delivery capability.

9. It would be unwise to press for the inclusion of this force in the 1958 Emergency Defence Plan list of atomic delivery forces, until the essential aircraft modification programme is completed. This is not scheduled to start until the early part of 1958.

SACEUR's Strategic Reserve

6. In Annex 'A', under SACEUR's Strategic Reserve, the United Kingdom is shown as providing two infantry divisions of N + 90 days. The two Territorial Army infantry divisions, which were originally earmarked for this task, were not declared in the United Kingdom submission to the NACO Annual Review - 1957; nor do they in fact appear in the Standing Group's Intant Tentative Assignment of Forces for 1st January, 1958. They should, therefore, be deleted from the Emergency Defence Plan.

CONCLUSION

11. We conclude that SACEUR's Emergency Defence Plan for 1958 is acceptable, subject to the deletion of two United Kingdom infantry divisions from his Strategic Reserve.