Poland in the Warsaw Pact 1955–1991: An appraisal of the role of Poland in the political structures of the Warsaw Pact

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Poland was one of the eight founding members of the Warsaw Pact (WP). At the time of the organization’s founding in May 1955, its stated raison d’être was the threat perceived by Moscow and its satellites as arising from West Germany’s membership in NATO.

This article aims to show the main aspects of Polish participation in the WP. This topic was the subject of articles and books published before the political transition in Poland in 1989. Due to political constraints, however, this body of literature is often not objective. More recently, more scholarly work showing different aspects of Polish participation in the Soviet bloc structures, including in the WP, has been published.

This paper is based on the documents stored in the Polish Archives of New Records, mainly the collection of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Institute of National Remembrance. Though the Politburo, and, at times, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party, made the final decisions on the nation’s foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played an important role in planning and implementing foreign policy as well. The main documents are to be found in the collection of the Cabinet of the Minister and collections of the territorial departments. Some documents useful for historians working on Polish foreign relations have been published lately. Also, the holdings of the Institute of National Remembrance are useful for some aspects of the country’s foreign policy. As far as Poland’s activities within the WP are concerned, the Institute’s archives contain some documents from the Polish Defense Ministry dealing with the WP that were declassified and passed on to the Institute by Polish Defense Minister Radosław Sikorski in 2006.

I do not pretend to deal with all aspects of Poland’s membership in the WP, or to cover all aspects of Polish foreign policy. I will concentrate on the political aspects and try to show Poland’s actions when political issues of special interest for Poland were discussed within the WP. Military issues will only be discussed in this context. The political surroundings, mostly the Polish domestic ones – though they were sometimes the result of changes in the world or the Soviet Union – will mark the main caesurae in the general structure of this article.
1955/6–1970

The first period in the history of the WP was a time of establishing rules. Initially, it was unclear how this organization was to operate in terms of both political and military structures. The creation of the WP coincided with major internal changes in the Soviet Union and within the Eastern bloc. During the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed a new policy toward the bloc countries, which were to gain more leeway to make their own decisions. Cominform was dissolved, and Joseph Stalin’s repression of members of the Communist Party of Poland in the late 1930s was exposed as unjustified. During the Congress, Polish Stalinist leader Bolesław Bierut died, and a struggle for power followed. It concluded with the rise to power of Władysław Gomułka as first secretary of the PUWP in October 1956. Gomułka was perceived by many people as a ‘national Communist’ who had been persecuted during the Stalinist era in Poland because of his views. For instance, Gomułka was opposed to adopting the Soviet model of agriculture and was critical of Polish-Soviet economic relations in the coal sector, which were conducted on terms that he regarded as exploitative. Gomułka wanted to re-model Polish-Soviet relations, and the problem of military relations, including in the WP context, become a very important issue. As Poland prepared for bilateral talks with the Soviet Union, a number of background reports were prepared and presented to Gomułka, including a memorandum concerning the WP and the development of the Polish armed forces. The memorandum stated that because the WP Unified Armed Forces were organized following a supranational model, because their leadership rested with a single supreme commander who was in fact not responsible to any multinational institution, and because the organization had formally enshrined a collegial format of decisionmaking, the current shape of the WP violated the principle of independence and sovereignty of its members. It also stated that Polish agreements with the Soviet Union and the WP could not be reconciled with the new policy of the Polish leadership. Since negotiations between the Soviet Union and Poland were often tough and the Soviets viewed Polish foreign and domestic policy after 1956 with astonishment, Khrushchev told Gomułka that he and the Polish leadership had misunderstood Khrushchev’s statement of March 1956, in which he had proclaimed the equality of the bloc members. Polish attempts to gain more room for maneuver in relations with the Soviet Union and the Western states instead resulted in a deterioration of bilateral relations. In retaliation, Moscow forbade Poland to produce certain Soviet arms, for instance the MiG-21 fighter.
Initially, the WP political structures, such as the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), had no precisely defined authority. The frequency of meetings was low; in fact, no decisions of importance were taken during the meetings. This started to change during the Second Berlin Crisis. Moscow wanted the WP members to follow its policy and to help in realizing the Kremlin’s political goals. This demand was linked to the cost of armaments, for which Moscow expected to be paid, to a large extent, by the bloc members. Polish leaders were opposed to this idea, especially as the growing costs of production and purchasing of military equipment, mostly from the Soviet Union, were not (politically) balanced by awarding more places on the Unified Staff of the WP forces to Polish officers. During the Political Consultative Committee meeting in Moscow in March 1961, Gomułka stated that Poland’s military expenditures came at the cost of meeting the basic needs of Polish society, such as building new flats and improving supplies of food and other goods. Poland was not the only country that protested against this state of affairs. Romania and Czechoslovakia were also dissatisfied with the new allocation of financial duties as proposed by Moscow.

After the Second Berlin Crisis, the Polish party leadership and the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs observed growing activity in East-West relations, especially in the case of relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany. The Polish side assumed that contact across the Iron Curtain might be intensified systematically. In some specific cases, however, this could endanger Polish interests. This dilemma explains the Polish reaction to the idea of closer consultation of the Warsaw Pact countries in the field of the foreign policy. In early 1964, Moscow suggested that the ministers of foreign affairs of the WP should meet more frequently to discuss foreign policy issues. Gomułka advocated this idea. The main reason for his support for more regular consultations seems to have been a conviction that this would give him (or Poland) greater influence on the shape of the WP’s foreign policy, and that this would also prevent a situation where the common policies of the Eastern bloc could progress in an undesirable direction, such as unilateral decisionmaking by any of the WP’s individual members, notably the Soviet Union. Such a situation would place the other countries in a difficult situation. Although one cannot exclude entirely the possibility that Gomułka’s thinking was influenced by ideological considerations, he was usually a realist in foreign policy matters.

The issue of foreign policy consultations was discussed during a WP Political Consultative Committee meeting in Warsaw in January 1965. During this meeting, Gomułka tried to persuade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the first secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party, to support more frequent meetings of the bloc countries’ foreign ministers. Gomułka pointed out that such consultations did not mean that a new special organ (office) had to be
established. The existing mechanism could be used, and foreign ministers’ meetings could serve to improve the circulation of information and thus foster the establishment of a common position. He also cited examples where a lack of consultation had caused problems, such as Khrushchev’s idea of visiting the Federal Republic of Germany or the announcement by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1964, in which he had proposed holding a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, at that time simply referred to as the “European Conference”. However, Gomułka added that the proposal for more frequent consultations was only a general idea, and that Poland would like to discuss the details with the other bloc countries.

Reluctance on the part of Romania did not discourage Moscow from the idea of an interior reform of the WP. In January 1966, Leonid Brezhnev returned to this idea and presented Moscow’s concepts in a letter to the bloc countries leaders. According to the later Polish report on the PCC meeting in Budapest in March 1969, when the establishment of the Committee of Ministers of Defense was announced, it was emphasized during the meeting that the Soviet letter of 1966 had also been prepared due to the suggestions of the Polish side. The Polish documents, especially those outlining the planning process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the resulting memoranda sent to Gomułka and other members of the PUWP Politburo, are evidence that concerning both the military and political structures of the WP, Poland expected reforms that would make the decisionmaking process more collegial and would strengthen the position of individual members. In the case of the military structures, one of Poland’s demands was a reorganization of the structure of the Unified Armed Forces. The Polish government believed that the financial burden should correspond to the degree of influence in this body. The Polish proposal – which would have raised the share of costs to be borne by Moscow and reduced the financial burden on the Polish side – was contrary to that of the Kremlin, which would actually have further increased Poland’s financial obligations. The Polish side was also opposed to any language discussing reform in the WP documents according to which the General Staff of the Soviet Army “gives recommendations to the ministers of defense of the bloc”. Polish officials wanted to substitute the phrase “gives recommendations” with “presents proposals”, which would then be discussed and accepted or perhaps even rejected by the bloc countries. In both cases – in the financial debates as well as in this debate over the role of the Soviet General Staff – the Poles were successful. They were also able to convince the Soviets to abandon the idea that the national forces should be completely integrated into the Unified Armed Forces of the WP.

As for the political structures, the Poles wanted the PCC to meet two or three times per year, and also wanted the ministers and deputy foreign ministers to consult more regularly.
Furthermore, they lobbied in favor of founding a council of the WP consisting of the national leaders, and pointed out the need to establish a secretariat to coordinate the work of the WP organs. As Romania strongly opposed any notion of reform, Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski had a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev after the deputy foreign ministers’ meeting in Berlin in February 1966. According to instructions of the Polish Foreign Ministry (however, the idea had to be approved by the Politburo), Naszkowski suggested creating a pact of the four countries interested in reform of the WP, namely Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. This idea was based on the Iron Triangle concept (cooperation between Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland in the German question), which the Soviets attempted to build from 1954 onward, and which reemerged in discussions in the fall of 1966 as a result of the West German new Ostpolitik. In this case, however, the Polish side wanted Moscow to become directly engaged in reform measures, which was probably unrealistic since Moscow preferred to play the role of “supervisor” in the bloc and was intent on avoiding dividing the WP by working more closely—in an official framework—with any group of countries.

Before the June 1966 foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow, Poland modified its proposal for reform of the WP’s political structures, discarding the idea of establishing a council of the WP and concentrating on strengthening the PCC’s role and promoting the idea of working meetings of foreign ministers ahead of PCC conferences. But at this point, the reform ideas failed. During the PCC meeting in Budapest in March 1969, only a Committee of the Ministers of Defense was established.

The June 1966 meeting in Moscow took place after Bonn had launched a new policy toward the Eastern bloc countries, which strongly influenced the Polish interest in Warsaw Pact reform. The second factor that determined the Polish attitude towards the idea of close consultations were developments in Asia, in particular the growing engagement of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries in supporting Vietnam. The Poles, like the other bloc countries, helped the North Vietnamese by providing them with food, technical and military equipment, medicine, and construction of factories in Vietnam (for instance, a sugar refinery). The Poles wanted to stop the war and were engaged in diplomatic actions aimed at facilitating talks between the parties to the conflict. When secret negotiations held under the codename “Operation Marigold” broke down, the Polish side was sure that the talks had failed due to ill will on the part of some US politicians. At the same time, similar accusations against Poland were voiced in the US. The Poles were afraid that the Vietnam conflict could escalate to the point of direct military engagement of the USSR and the WP and pressed for the establishment of a more collective decisionmaking process inside the Pact structures,
especially with respect to the use of national forces within the framework of the WP. The Polish politicians, especially Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rapacki and his collaborators, perceived Asia as a very dangerous battlefield in the Cold War, not least regarding a potential future confrontation between China and the Soviet Union. Therefore, they wanted to avoid any involvement of the WP in Asian rivalries, fearing that Poland, which had no interest in Asia, would have to become engaged there due to the USSR’s global strategy. This perception had already surfaced earlier, as seen in 1963, when Mongolia (supported by the Soviet Union) wanted to join the WP. The Polish side was afraid that the field of activity described in the WP’s founding documents (aggression in Europe) would have to be geographically expanded, laying the groundwork for possible deployment of Polish forces outside of Europe.

In the 1960s, Poland participated in some WP activities outside of Europe, but preferred to concentrate on the European arena, foremost on the German question, which had special significance for Warsaw. The Polish stance was strongly influenced by the lack of de jure recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and the lack of full diplomatic relations between Poland and West Germany. This problem was linked to the Polish idea of a European Conference, the general outlines of which had been presented in 1964 by Rapacki. The Polish side elaborated the concept after the beginning of the new Ostpolitik in 1966. According to one of the documents describing Polish expectations during the internal deliberations on the conference idea, the Oder-Neisse line issue constituted one of the crucial elements: “The main aim of the conference was to gain West Germany’s acceptance of the territorial and political status quo in Europe.” The European conference was initially considered a quasi peace conference, and the Polish authorities wanted to avoid strengthening West Germany’s international status, while at the same time minimizing the chances for eventual German reunification. Nevertheless, Polish expectations went beyond the German context. The second important topic that was to be discussed during a European conference was economic collaboration. The establishment of economic relations with the West would change Polish relations with Moscow, giving the Polish authorities more room for maneuver. But this did not mean that, at least in the short term, there would be any change in Poland’s political regime. The idea of facilitating economic collaboration with the West and discussing innovative conceptions of security can be described as an attempt to change relations within the bloc, ultimately with the aim of making Poland less dependent on the Soviet Union. The Polish leadership hastened to forward its ideas in negotiations with the USSR due to concerns that Moscow would treat the conference as a mere instrument for facilitating further bilateral talks with the US and other Western countries, thereby excluding the rest of the Eastern bloc. This would, in fact, have led to a
strengthening of Moscow’s hegemony over the bloc countries, and Polish goals for the conference would never have been achieved.\textsuperscript{25}

The Poles started to propagate their ideas in Western Europe and sought cooperation with the Western states, especially Belgium. They also tried to persuade Moscow and the bloc countries, but gained little sympathy for their position, both regarding the question of recognition of the status quo on borders as well as regarding the proposal on expanding economic relations with the West.\textsuperscript{26} The Polish determination to convince the allies was nonetheless visible in the tough talks with the Soviets, especially those with Vladimir Semyonovich Semyonov in 1969.\textsuperscript{27}

The interest in European questions of vital importance to Poland and support for the idea of seeking compromise in existing conflicts (Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet split, the Arab-Israeli conflict following the 1967 war) were typical for the Polish participation in WP political activities in the era of Gomu\łka.\textsuperscript{28} On the other hand, Gomu\łka was not tolerant of “ideological perils”, and in 1968, Poland took part in the WP invasion of Czechoslovakia to stop the Prague Spring. In fact, the Poles were active in planning the event.\textsuperscript{29}

A very interesting question is the matter of when nuclear weapons were first stored in Poland. Some time ago, documents were discovered proving that in February 1967, a bilateral agreement was concluded between the Polish and Soviet armed forces in which Poland agreed to the storage of nuclear weapons and constructed storage facilities for them. But that does not mean that no such weapons had been kept in Poland before that date.\textsuperscript{30} At the time, Poland had difficulties procuring certain types of arms from the USSR, including those to be delivered to Poland under earlier agreements, such as the MiG-21 fighter. Moscow explained that these delays were due to Soviet support for the Arab countries.\textsuperscript{31} On the other side, due to Moscow’s high expectations and the lack of financial resources on the Polish side, the Polish leadership could not accept Soviet recommendations with respect to the build-up of Polish military forces.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{1970–1980}

In December 1970, shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Warsaw, which de facto recognized the Oder-Neisse line and enabled the establishment of diplomatic relations, and which was perceived by the Polish government of the day as a big success, Gomułka was forced to quit the position of first secretary. He was replaced by Edward Gierek. The change in the party leadership, however, did not immediately cause major changes in Polish foreign policy. In the early 1970s, Polish participation in the WP structures can be described as a
continuation of the lines drawn in the 1960s. Poland was still interested in reform of the political structures of the WP, even after the negative experiences of its attempt to persuade other bloc members to support Polish ideas for the CSCE. Indeed, these experiences may even have reinforced the Polish determination to push for reforms.

At that time, the idea of reforming the WP political structures was not popular, and the Soviet Union also appears to have stopped supporting it. Moscow began to develop informal mechanisms of consultation and coordination that were not codified in the Warsaw Treaty Organization Statute. This is likely to have been due to the fact that, at least from a legal point of view, decisions made by the Political Consultative Committee were (or should have been) binding upon the member states. Thus, the PCC's conclusions were carefully worked out, interested sides were ready to fight for specific wording, and the editorial committees often had a lot work. Romania, opposed to the idea of new bodies within the WP, argued that the existing mechanisms were sufficient. Regarding the proposal for a European Conference, Poland preferred the involvement of all countries of the Eastern bloc. During negotiations in 1969, Soviet diplomat Semyonov stated that some of the Polish ideas on the CSCE (namely those referring to the border issues) could be included in the declaration to be announced after the PCC meeting in Prague in October 1969. Semyonov also said, however, that there was a possibility the Soviets might eventually have to retract their support for some of the Polish formulations, for example the passages referring to the border question, should they later clash with Soviet priorities during diplomatic efforts. Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Józef Winiewicz insisted that, after being accepted by the PCC, these ideas would form the basis for a common Warsaw Pact program and that the members of the WP would collectively decide about next steps in this matter, opposing unilateral steps by Moscow. In doing so, the Polish minister based his stance on the formal decisionmaking process within the bloc that was often ignored by the Soviets. Since many differences emerged between the WP member states during talks on the German question and European security, especially after 1966, it may have been convenient for the Soviets to opt for other forms of consultations, such as more frequent bilateral meetings and a semi-formal multilateral meeting in Crimea organized in the summers of 1971, 1972, and 1973. The meetings largely consisted of presentations by Brezhnev, which were effectively instructions for the other bloc countries. From 1974 onwards, conferences attended by all general secretaries (or nearly all) were essentially discontinued and replaced by bilateral meetings or meetings of smaller groups, usually organized on the occasion of a holiday. The system of bilateral meetings between secretaries was also an important element of defining common policies. In addition to bilateral questions, international problems were discussed. In the 1970s, a system of consultations on various
levels (Politburo secretaries of different branches, directors of departments of particular ministries) was developed. The foundation of a common Institute of International Affairs of all WP member states was also discussed. Some of these proposals came as a surprise to the Polish government. In his memoirs, Mieczysław Rakowski (the last person to serve as first secretary of the PUWP) wrote that the Kremlin had considered founding collective institutes of culture abroad and that the Polish Politburo had opposed the proposal. Polish newspapers, or at least some publications, were liberal by the standards of the Eastern bloc, and Moscow made clear to the Polish side that it was unhappy about this.

The idea of intensifying the integration of the Soviet bloc was one of the outcomes of détente and was seen as a potential countermeasure against the increasing opportunities for bloc countries to establish bilateral contacts in softer areas such as culture, science, and economics, with the Western countries. Growing contacts with the West – it was feared – could endanger the Soviet rule and weaken Communist ideology because people would gain access to more and alternative information and would learn more about the outside world.

After the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, Moscow returned to the idea of founding a body responsible for the coordination of foreign policy within the WP. A Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (CMFA) was established in 1976 and took up its work in 1977. In a sense, the Polish side was disappointed with its capacities. After the first meeting of CMFA, Polish Foreign Minister Emil Wojtaszek noted that when Poland had tried to raise a more serious discussion on disarmament and the bloc’s policy toward developing countries, the Soviet Union had reacted with reservation. This reaction was justified by reference to the Romanian attitude on common policymaking, but this reason did not appear convincing, and Wojtaszek wrote that it might be possible in the future to hold working meetings and not only discuss international topics on a bilateral basis, which was the form of consultation proposed by Moscow. According to a note of a conversation that Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Stanisław Trepczyński had with the Soviet side in November 1975, Moscow was considering founding a body called the “Political Committee of the WP” instead of the CMFA. In 1974 and 1975, Polish diplomats had several talks on reforming the WP, with one held on the occasion of the WP’s 20th anniversary celebrations in Warsaw, which Poland considered an appropriate venue to announce a reform of the organization. Moscow abandoned the idea of a huge celebration parading weapons and troops, probably with an eye on the final talks on the CSCE. At the same time (in 1976 in Budapest), the Unified Secretariat of the WP took up its work, but its authority was restricted to purely technical matters. Preparing its projects of reform in the 1960s, Warsaw expected the Secretariat to play a more important role. Also at the end of the 1970s, Polish politicians considered further reform of the political structures, but the Soviets
told them that because of the Romanian stance, there was no point in discussing them.44 Romania was of the opinion that political problems should be discussed and agreed during inter-governmental talks and not at the level of the WP.

From the Polish point of view, the most important topics discussed by WP members at the beginning of the 1970s remained the German question and the CSCE. In the case of bilateral Polish-West German relations, the WP structures started to become an obstructive factor. As Poland had been successful in negotiating the Treaty of Warsaw, the other bloc countries wanted Poland to wait with establishing bilateral relations until they concluded their own treaties. In December 1970, Gomułka informed the other bloc countries that Warsaw would establish bilateral relations with Bonn immediately after ratification.45 But the ratification process took a long time on the West German side, and after the ratification of the bilateral treaty in May 1972, certain external obstacles appeared. The Soviet Union and other bloc countries, such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia (the last two of which had not yet completed their talks with West Germany), were opposed to Poland’s establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany at this time.46 Without a clear “yes” from Moscow, Prague, and East Berlin (fortunately for Poland, there was also no unambiguous “no”, although Poland had prepared for such a contingency by explaining to Bonn why it was not possible to exchange ambassadors should Moscow be opposed to the idea), Poland decided to establish bilateral relations in September 1972.

In the case of the CSCE, Poland tried to convince the Soviet Union to prepare a proposal for inter-bloc economic cooperation that would create more possibilities for the bloc countries. The Soviet Union was interested in improving its own economic relations with the West, but had no interest in allowing the bloc countries to open up any further, due to the attendant ideological danger, and even stated as much to Polish officials.47 Poland also tried to enhance its collaboration with Hungary on this question, but largely failed. The Soviet Union, for its part, prepared draft documents that were presented during the first stages of CSCE negotiations by the particular bloc countries as their own proposals. Internal documents show that the Poles were critical of these proposals – like the one on cultural cooperation, which was to be presented by Poland –, but decided not to display their critical stance.48 Poland tried to follow up on the CSCE talks and to prevent any decisions that would be against its interests, mainly relating to affirmation of the status quo on borders and the question of sovereignty.

A very important question discussed within the bloc was the problem of armaments. From the Polish point of view, this was a sensitive issue, especially because Poland ran into economic and financial problems in the second half of the 1970s. Even though the Polish government had a strong interest in disarmament, it did not engage in open opposition
towards the Soviet plans of WP arms modernization, as did Romania. Poland participated in the Vienna talks and followed the discussions between the major powers on these questions.49

Since the 1960s, Poland had devoted a lot of attention to its activities in the Baltic region, and in the 1970s, it promoted the idea of improving coordination of the bloc’s policy in this region, which was accepted by Moscow.50

In the 1970s, Poland also intensified its engagement in the Middle East conflict as well as in Africa; however, Poland was never the leading bloc country when it came to relations with Arab or African countries.51

1980–1991

The beginning of the 1980s was a difficult time for the Communist leadership in Poland, and the Polish domestic situation also influenced the overall situation in the WP. Poland became a topic of many inter-bloc meetings organized both with and without Polish participation, as the rise of the Solidarność trade union posed a threat to Communist power.52 After the strikes and the introduction of martial law, the Polish authorities concentrated on domestic events and on strengthening their power.53

The difficult economic situation in Poland influenced the Polish attitude towards the financial aspects of participation in the WP. In preparation for talks with the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces, Marshal Viktor Kulikov, in December 1982, for instance, the Polish General Staff aimed to reduce the size of its air force by eliminating obsolete aircraft types. According to WP recommendations, the Poles were to modernize their navy. The Soviet Union, however (probably due to its own economic problems), was not able to assist by making more financial credit available. As a result, Warsaw was forced to discard the modernization program.54

Poland also tried to limit its engagement in the countries of the developing world, but could not discontinue it entirely. These costs were also an outcome of membership in organizations such as the WP and COMECOM. In 1984, for instance, Poland extended a line of credit to Nicaragua consisting of two parts: one for so-called civilian delivery and one for “special” – i.e., military – deliveries. Poland also gave non-repayable aid to Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984.55

In 1984, Poland, as the depositary state of the founding treaty, proposed that the continued existence of WP be secured by preparing a protocol (ratified by member states).56 In April 1985 in Warsaw, it was announced that the organization would be extended for another 20 years.
After Mikhail Gorbachev had risen to the position of the first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a special meeting of bloc leaders was organized in Sofia during one of the PCC meetings in October 1985. Considering the ideas forwarded during this meeting, neither Gorbachev nor Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski gave the impression of being in favor of “revolutionary” changes. Jaruzelski spoke about the need for closer collaboration within the bloc in order to ward off the Western offensive in the field of human rights and saw a need for deeper integration within the bloc. But he also mentioned that there was a need for glasnost in the public life of Socialist countries, mentioning the Polish experience with Solidarność as an example of how facts and events that the Communist Party had tried to keep secret later took on a life of their own, as they were being discussed in so-called “second circulation publications” as well as in society at large.

By the mid-1980s, relations between East and West had become less hostile, and the Polish domestic situation had improved to a certain degree. Taking advantage of this situation, Poland was interested in stressing its role in the bloc and overcoming its international isolation following the declaration of martial law in December 1981. This probably led to the so-called Jaruzelski Plan of 1987. Poland’s actions may have been inspired by other bloc states that had prepared initiatives of their own, such as Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. It is difficult to say to what extent these activities were inspired by the Soviets. In the case of the Jaruzelski Plan, no available documents indicate a direct influence, but to outside observers, Poland’s initiatives may have appeared similar to the Soviet Union’s ideas concerning disarmament announced at that time. In the fall of 1986, experts prepared a note on a new Polish initiative that was still being developed concerning confidence-building measures and arms limitation, first in the Baltic Sea region and later in Central Europe. It was stressed that the Polish project should not be treated as a simple continuation of either the Rapacki Plan or the Gomułka Plan. The outline of the plan was officially presented by Jaruzelski at a Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth (PRON) Congress on 8 May 1987. The proposal concerned nine states: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, West Germany, Denmark, and the Benelux countries. Four groups of problems were suggested for discussion: the gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of participating countries to the point of full denuclearization; freezing the acquisition of conventional arms that were considered “especially dangerous and which could be used for a surprise attack”; a review of military doctrines in order to make them defensive in nature; and “new measures of confidence and security building”, later referred to as “third-generation measures”.

The Polish attitude towards the reforms of the bloc that were begun in 1987 was initially positive. Some even claimed that the foundation of the Multilateral Group of
Reciprocal Current Information had been a Polish idea, but (at least barring the discovery of further evidence) that seems not to have been the case. The second new body was the Disarmament Commission.

The idea of democratizing the WP came at the point when the bloc countries were beginning to push for a relaxation of their relations with Moscow. Simultaneously, some more orthodox countries, such as Romania, were considering strengthening cooperation and reinforcing the “political character of the WP”. But the opposite approach was the dominant one. However, the Polish attitude in 1989/90 was slightly different from that of some other bloc countries, or at least more nuanced. When, for instance, Budapest and Prague declared that they would like to start talks on the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces, the Polish side stated that it was not interested in such a development. In an article in Gazeta Wyborcza, the need to maintain the Soviet presence was couched in the context of German reunification. The unclear attitude of the West German side to the question of the permanent character of the Oder-Neisse line and with respect to Polish participation in the so-called “Two Plus Four” negotiations strongly influenced the Polish stance. In talks with US President George H.W. Bush in March 1990, Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki stated that it might be advisable to maintain the Soviet military presence in East Germany as well.

In late 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, Moscow still tried to keep the WP alive and to maintain control over the armies of the former bloc members and prevent their aspiration to start cooperating with NATO. The bloc countries were warned against this course during the CMFA meeting in February 1991. But by that time, there was no longer any interest in the continuation of close contacts with Moscow. The WP was dissolved in July 1991, and some of its former members soon started to declare aloud their interest in seeking contacts with NATO.

Conclusions

Poland’s participation in the WP was an outcome of the international and domestic situation, i.e., the character of the leadership in Poland, its ideas concerning the Polish place in the bloc and in world politics, and the possibilities of realizing Poland’s foreign-policy goals. The national perspective on the WP’s activities provides new facts and shows new aspects of the inner life of the alliance, but also brings with it the danger that the individual bloc member’s policy may dominate the general picture, which can be described in brief as follows: The WP was an instrument of Soviet hegemonic power in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, and the maneuvering space of individual members was very limited, especially when it came to shaping military and global policy.
It is also worth mentioning, however, that individual countries were able to press Moscow to take their interests into account in its planning, and could oppose some moves that would have cost them too much in economic as well as, occasionally, political terms. This leeway was greater in times of turbulences or crisis in the “center of power”, i.e., the Kremlin.

Was Poland a troublesome ally within the WP? Sometimes it was. After 1956 and in the 1960s, the Polish ideas of what “coordination and cooperation” should mean were not shared by Moscow, and the Polish stance forced the Soviets to devote more attention and endeavors to persuade the Polish leadership to abandon or change its interpretation of this term. The same also applies to some political ideas. In the 1970s, and especially after 1974, controversies between Moscow and Warsaw were not visible, even if there was some criticism of Soviet ideas in Poland. At the beginning of the 1980s, the WP experienced problems due to the domestic situation in Poland, rather than because of aspirations for more independence on the part of the Polish leadership. It seems that in the second half of the 1980s, Polish policy generally concurred with that of Gorbachev. During the process of German reunification, Poland, bewildered by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s stance and feeling insecure – quite unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia, for example, – was not interested in the rapid dissolution of WP ties and in fact did not immediately start talks on the withdrawal of the Soviet Army. The Soviet Army remained in Poland until 17 September 1993. The day on which the last Soviet troops left Poland was not chosen by chance. It was exactly 54 years to the day since the Soviet Union had attacked Poland at the start of the Second World War.


2 In 2003, I was allowed to study the files of the top secret chancellery of the foreign ministers, especially of Adam Rapacki, which contain documents on Polish policy in Europe and Asia (China, Vietnam) as well as documents describing Poland’s activity in the Warsaw Pact.
3 Documents dealing with Polish diplomacy are published in the following series: Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne, eds Sławomir Dębski, Włodzimierz Borodziej (Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, PISM; Polish Institute of International Affairs).


5 Memorandum w sprawie Układu Warszawskiego oraz planu rozwoju Sił Zbrojnych PRL, 7.11.1956, in: W. Jarzabek, PRL w politycznych strukturach..., f. 104f.


policy in the years 1966–7, see: W. Jarząbek, “Ulbricht-Doktrin’ oder ‘Gomułka – Doktrin’?”, H.1;
13 The Polish documents on Poland’s participation in this operation were kept in the top secret chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Polish point of view is presented in: AMSZ, GM KTSZ 1/77, w.16, Notatka na temat rozmów w sprawie Wietnamu listopad – grudzień 1966r., 1.06.1967 r. Note on the course of events prepared by Ambassador Jerzy Michałowski, dealing with this question from the Polish side: Notatka na temat rozmów w sprawie Wietnamu listopad – grudzień 1966 r., 5 May 1967, published in: W. Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych strukturach..., 217f. When US Ambassador to Warsaw J. Gronouski tried to encourage Poland to engage once more in the mediation mission, the Poles were no longer interested, as Rapacki informed him: AMSZ, GM KTSZ, 1/77, w.16, Pilna notatka z rozmowy a amb. USA Gronouskim 19.XII.66, A. Rapacki, 20 grudnia 1966. This stance was also presented to Gronouski by Michałowski, who mentioned a lack of confidence in the US side. Pilna notatka z rozmowy z amb. Gronuskim w dniu 5 stycznia 1967 r., 6 January 1967, in: W. Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych strukturach..., 214f. There is little evidence of Polish-Soviet talks at that time.
18 Pilna notatka z rozmowy z v-min. SZ ZSRR tow. Siemionowem w dniu 26.IX.br. w Warszawie (z inicjatywy radzieckiej) in: W. Jarząbek, Polska wobec Konferencji..., 200f.


32 For example, the Soviet Union wanted Poland to build a WP command center. AAN KC PZPR, XIA/104, list marszałka I. Jakubowskiego do W. Jaruzelskiego i list ministra obrony W. Jaruzelskiego do W. Gomułki, 16.12.1970.


34 AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/81, Notatka, b.d.

35 AMSZ, DFIP, z.5/82, Notatka, 4.01.1972, AAN KC PZPR, XIB/109, Notatka dot. systemu konsultacji i koordynacji polityki zagranicznej państw Układu Warszawskiego, no date.


37 In talks with a diplomat from the Polish embassy in Moscow, a Soviet official pointed out that “a wave of sexualism is spreading in the Polish press that is incompatible with the socialist cultural model”, PDD 1972, Szyfrogram z Moskwy, 16.06.1972, 336.

38 See for instance: AAN, KC PZPR XIA/ 596, Informacja o przebiegu rozmowy I Sekretarza KC PZPR tow. Edwarda Gierka z Sekretarzem Generalnym KC KPZR tow. Leonidem Breżniewem w dniu 23 czerwca 1975 r. w Moskwie,

39 AMSZ, DSiP, z.5/82, Notatka, 4.01.1972, AAN KC PZPR, XIB/109, Notatka dot. systemu konsultacji i koordynacji polityki zagranicznej państw Układu Warszawskiego, no date.


41 Notatka informacyjna z pierwszego posiedzenia Komitetu Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych państw – stron UW w Moskwie w dniach 25–26 maja br., E. Wojtaszek, 27.05.1977, in: W. Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych...,

42 AMSZ, DFIP, z. 3/79, w.4, Notatka informacyjna z rozmów wiceministra St. Trepczyńskiego w Moskwie z N. Rodionowem i G. Szachnazarowem, S. Trepczyński, 13.11.1975.


44 AAN, KC PZPR, XIB/183, Pilna notatka z konsultacji w MSZ z I – z-cą ministra SZ ZSRR W. Malcewem /26 – 27.04/, 2.05.1979.


47 AMSZ, DSiP, z.63/77, w.3, Pilna notatka o konsultacjach ekspertów Departamentu Studiów i Programowania z ekspertami Związku Radzieckiego na temat przygotowań do EKBiW (problemy ekonomiczne), J. Czyrek, 18.02.1972.

48 W. Jarząbek, Polska wobec..., 91f.; see also Hope and Reality, 30f.

49 AMSZ, DSiP, z.2/84, w.4, Sprawozdanie delegacji PRL na XIV rundę rokowań wiedeńskich w sprawie wzajemnych redukcji sił zbrojnych i zbrojeń w Europie Środkowej /31 stycznia – 19 kwietnia 1978/, 29.04.1978, Strula, ibid.: Projekt propozycji państw socjalistycznych – bezpośrednich uczestników rokowań w sprawie wzajemnej redukcji sił zbrojnych i zbrojeń w Europie Środkowej, 7.06.1978.

50 W. Jarząbek, PRL w politycznych..., 80f., Notatka informacyjna dot. spotkania konsultacyjnego wiceministrów spraw zagranicznych państw członków Układu Warszawskiego 19–20 marca 1975 r. oraz spotkania trójstronnego wiceministrów SZ ZSRR, NRD i PRL (21 marca 1975 r.), 24.03.1975, ibid., 347f.

51 Ibid., 85f.

52 Many documents from the Polish archives and the archives of the other former Soviet bloc countries showing reactions to the situation in Poland, documents of the inter-bloc consultations, and bilateral talks between bloc officials have been selected in an international project and published in: Przed i po 13 grudnia. Państwa bloku wschodniego wobec kryzysu w PRL 1980 – 1982, vols. 1 and 2, Warsaw 2006, 2007. Selected by Iskra Baeva, Petr Blažek, Łukasz Kamiński, Michael Kubina, Andrzej Paczkowski, Monika Tantzscher, Janos Tischler, Manfred Wilke, and Norbert Wójtowicz, ed. Ł. Kamiński.


54 IPN BU 02958/554, Problemy do rozmów z Naczelnym Dowódcą Zjednoczonych Sił Zbrojnych Układu Warszawskiego Marszałkiem Związku Radzieckiego W.G. Kulikowem w dniu 15.12.1982 r.


57 Many documents from the Polish archives and the archives of the other former Soviet bloc countries showing reactions to the situation in Poland, documents of the inter-bloc consultations, and bilateral talks between bloc officials have been selected in an international project and published in:

58 See: W. Jarząbek, Hope and Reality, 52f.

59 IPN BU 02958/417, Rozwinięte założenia planu zmniejszania zbrojń i zwiększania zaufania w strefie Europy Środkowej. The Jaruzelski Plan was modified.


62 Janusz Reiter, Po co te wojska?, Gazeta Wyborcza, 14 February 1990.
