

A Brief Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Political Process of 1957-1959

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The Sino-Soviet alliance which lasted from 1950s to the early 1960s constituted a significant part of the diametrical opposition between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. However, the communist alliance, to which Stalin and Mao had accorded a life expectancy, of thirty years, lasted only a little over ten before the split. Sino-Soviet opposition resulted in a fundamental change in Soviet-American antagonism. This study is intended to investigate the nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

From 1957 to 1959, the Sino-Soviet Alliance went through a series of dramatic changes. This thesis is focused on an analysis of strategy and military affairs as the core of the alliance, especially on exploring the nature of the alliance by focusing on the issue of the sharing of nuclear technology, the brewing of a plan for establishing Sino-Soviet military cooperation in Asia and the disputes and clashes arising from these matters.

The author presents two arguments: 1) Quarrels and clashes over nuclear technology sharing and the adjustments in the Sino-Soviet alliance intended by Khrushchev finally threw bilateral relations into a severe crisis. 2) Domestic political struggles in China and the Soviet Union were closely related to the evolution of the relations between the two countries. Specifically, why did the Soviet Union decide to give nuclear aid to China? Why did the Soviet leader Khrushchev and Mao Zedong fall out over the issue of a "joint fleet" in 1958? And why did such high-level military cooperation as nuclear technology sharing end so rapidly? By investigating these questions, the author has recognized that the domestic situations and power struggles within the leadership in both countries played a decisive role in the whole process.

I. Sino-Soviet Agreement on New Technologies for National Defense (1957)

Of the many mysteries still surrounding the *Sino-Soviet Agreement on New Technologies for Defense (1957)*; perhaps the biggest one is its content. Actually nothing specific has been known about the process of its negotiation and formulation, let alone to what extent the agreement had been implemented and how much nuclear weapons or technology had been transferred to China. Here for the sake of investigation, the author draws upon the *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*. Nie was then Vice Prime Minister who was also in charge of China's military industry including the development of nuclear weaponry. Later he was appointed chief director responsible for the negotiation of the agreement on behalf of China.

China showed its intense interest in possessing nuclear weapons much earlier than commonly believed. In 1954 Mao Zedong brought up the issue with Khrushchev while the latter was visiting China. Khrushchev was taken aback but said that the Soviet Union "could at least provide some help to China to build a small nuclear reactor."¹ In 1955, the Soviets began

contact with China with a view to drawing the country into peaceful utilization and development of nuclear power. But China had set out to make preparations for its new nuclear industry and development of nuclear weapons. Soon it asked a practical favor from its strategic partner. In January 1955, the Secretariat of the CPC Central Politburo heard presentations by a couple of scientists including Qian Sanqiang, and made “a strategic decision” to initiate nuclear research and industry. As a result a special work group was set up consisting of important figures like Chen Yun, Nie Rongzhen and Bo Yibo. Later, at a plenary meeting held by the State Department at the end of the month, Premier Zhou Enlai proposed guidelines for nuclear development. He said that “if Soviet help is available, we could catch up in the areas of military application and peaceful use of nuclear technology.”² On February 20 of the same year, China reached an agreement with the Soviet Union on the exploration and development of uranium mines. On April 27, the two countries signed a protocol concerning nuclear physical research and peaceful use of atomic energy. On January 15, 1956, Li Fuchun told the Soviet top leader Khrushchev that it would be preferable that the Soviet Union provide China with comprehensive support for its atomic energy scientific research, including research agenda, funds and raw material. This is considered the first official request from China. On the basis of communication and negotiation, a Sino-Soviet agreement on technological aid in the field of nuclear industry was finally concluded in Moscow on September 17, 1956.

However, the Chinese government seemed much more willing to devote its efforts to developing nuclear weapons, missiles and rocket weaponry rather than the costly peaceful use of atomic energy. At the time, the Chinese army was motivated by and became single-minded in nuclear development. In 1955, China’s Defense Minister, Peng Dehuai, emphasized the necessity of developing and manufacturing nuclear weapons in his military report. In April 1956, Nie Rongzhen, in his “Suggestions on 12-year Technological Research Adapted to the Needs of National Defense,” accented the importance of making mini-nuclear warheads, nuclear submarines and power furnaces for military use; his proposal was then adopted as a part of “Long-term Guidelines for Scientific and Technological Research (1956-1962).” In addition, Zhang Aiping, deputy chief of the General Staff, also recommended that “delegations of officials and engineers from institutions of aeronautic and missile development should be sent to the Soviet Union.”³ All these moves were backed up by China’s top leader Mao Zedong, who said in his speech “On Ten Major Relationships,” “Is your desire for the atom bomb genuine and very keen? ...If your desire is genuine and very keen, then you will reduce the proportion of military and administrative expenditures and spend more on economic construction....This is a matter of strategic policy.” He openly expressed his great interest in having nuclear weapons.

Against the background above, the Nuclear Weaponry Research Institute and an institution of missile development, i.e. the Fifth Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense established in May 1956, were created in the Ministry of Defense; meanwhile the Third Department of Mechanical Industry, which was designated to supervise nuclear industry and was headed by Song Renqiong, opened its office in the State Department in November 1956. In September 1958 after China and the Soviet Union signed the protocol of new defense technology, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, led by

Nie Rongzhen, began to operate as an institution supervising and managing the development of nuclear weapons, missiles and conventional weapons.

China was so eager to obtain Soviet aid in the technology of nuclear weapons and missiles that it began to choose members for a government delegation led by Nie Rongzhen bound for Moscow for negotiations in the middle of 1956. On August 17, 1956, the Chinese government issued an official request to the Soviets for missile technology, but received an unexpectedly passive response. The Soviet partners simply replied that they could accommodate 50 Chinese for special training at the very beginning. In March 1957, the two countries signed *Protocol of Providing China with Aids in the Field of Special Technology* in Moscow.

According to the *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*, China and the Soviet Union entered into direct communication with regard to technological support in June 1957. In the same month, Nie Rongzhen and Li Qiang, Vice-minister of Foreign Trade, met Alhibov, Soviet General Advisor of Economic and Technological Aid to China, and asked to open inter-governmental negotiations on Soviet help with China's development of atomic bomb and missiles. Alhibov made a formal commitment to welcoming Chinese delegations to visit the Soviet Union on July 22, after he had got directions from Moscow. On August 6, Premier Zhou Enlai officially notified Marshal Bulganin, then chairman of the Council of Ministers, that a Chinese governmental delegation was to go to Moscow for the negotiations on the Soviet aid to China's atomic energy industry, nuclear weaponry and missile manufacturing, and aeronautics. China was very active during these negotiations. On August 13, Li Qiang handed to Alhibov a "Catalogue of Main Issues for Negotiation on China's Development and Military Application of Nuclear Industry and Means of Delivery of Nuclear Weapons."

The bilateral talks in Moscow lasted from September 10 to October 15. Talks on military issues, nuclear energy, missiles, planes and long wave radio stations were conducted separately among five groups. During the process, Nie Rongzhen kept in close contact with Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai and Li Fuchun in China. On October 15, the two sides signed the "*Agreement between the Chinese Government and the Government of the Soviet Union on Manufacturing New-type Weapons and Military Technology Equipment and Building a Comprehensive Nuclear Industry in China.*" The Agreement consisting of 22 articles in 5 chapters providing that the Soviet Union should "provide the Chinese government with technological support in such areas as research and development of a comprehensive nuclear industry, nuclear weapons, rocket weapons, military planes, radio station equipment, and construction of a base for launching rocket and nuclear weapons." The agreement would remain valid from 1958 to 1964.⁴ In the course of negotiation, China also asked the Soviets to help with the development of nuclear submarines, but the Soviets refused, only saying that they would offer submarine blueprints and models for training purpose. As Chinese documents show, the Soviet Union in fact delayed the aid on the pretext of inadequate storage facilities and difficulty in maintaining secrecy. A year later they again promised but failed to deliver the submarine model and technological data to China.⁵

It should be noted that Chinese leaders including Mao Zedong had great interest in the development of nuclear weapons and missiles; especially military leaders like Peng Dehuai, Nie Rongzhen and Zhang Aiping who tried hard to promote the work. The view that nuclear

weapons could be used as a more effective and less costly means to check the United States and Taiwan on the Taiwan issue, and China's consideration of its "international reputation" may account for China's eagerness for a nuclear arsenal. In other words, China's possession of nuclear weapons would enable the nation to have much more say in future political negotiations, and step onto the international stage as "a major power." The fact that the British, following on the US and Soviet Union, were also actively pursuing nuclear research may have helped to rouse China's nuclear ambitions.

According to Nie Rongzhen, the agreement was successfully implemented in 1957; by the end of this year, missiles had been sent to Manzhouli and Soviet experts to build the rocket base had arrived. It was rumored that important Soviet personnel involved in nuclear research and development including 111 nuclear experts, 43 geologists of mining nuclear material, 13 KGB high officials, and 340 military specialists incorporated into the Ministry of Public Security had all entered China by the end of 1958.⁶

II. Why Did Khrushchev Provide China with Nuclear Aid?

Here the question is why the Soviet Russians changed their mind and promised to give China nuclear aid a year after they had held a negative attitude towards nuclear technology sharing. The following points might explain why.

1. Khrushchev began to readjust Soviet international strategy following his severe criticism of the former Soviet leader Stalin and call for "peaceful coexistence" in 1957. He tried to ease relations with the United States by reorganizing and strengthening the communist camp, which may explain the change in Soviet attitude. The formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 had been the first step in consolidating the communist camp. The Soviet Union sought to play the game of peaceful coexistence with the United States by means of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Pact. In this process, the Soviet Union felt it necessary to upgrade its relationship with the Eastern socialist country, China. In his official visit to Beijing in 1954, Khrushchev annulled some "unequal" articles of an economic agreement that Stalin had imposed upon China and according to which a Sino-Soviet joint venture had been authorized to develop mineral resources in Xinjiang. Thus the bilateral relations between the two countries were made "equal." Khrushchev considered this a part of his whole strategy.

In May 1955, Khrushchev had an interview with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai who went to Moscow to attend the inaugural meeting of the Warsaw Pact. Khrushchev stressed the necessity of the eastern enlargement of the Warsaw Pact and integration of the organization with the Sino-Soviet alliance. He expected that "the Chinese Government would try different ways of contacting the members of the Warsaw Pact; for instance, a diversity of measures contained in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance." He said "the great Soviet military power in the Far East and Pacific Area hopes to cooperate with Chinese army. I hope that we could take more opportunities to work together. But the problem is in what ways such cooperation could be legitimated." He suggested that "cooperative methods which will ensure the legitimate and flexible working of the two countries' military forces should be explored and negotiated for the purpose of safeguarding

peace and security in the Far East.” It may be conjectured from Khrushchev’s words that he had been contemplating since 1955 the establishment of a collective security system in the Far East with China included as a key member.⁷ He may have decided that to give China the nuclear aid it wanted would be “the best tool” to enhance the bilateral relations and materialize the Asian Security System with China’s participation.

2. The Soviet decision could be justified in an indirect way by the precarious position of the Soviet Union in the international community and the severe follow-up power struggles within the country after Khrushchev’s condemnation of Stalin. Khrushchev’s authority was not yet stable either in the socialist camp or at home, but could be expected to be fortified if he gave China extensive support including nuclear technological help. In that case, he would be in a firm position against his rivals at home and abroad.

Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin threw Eastern Europe into commotion. Anti-communist and anti-Soviet Union movements flourished in Poland and Hungary. Confronted with the thorny crisis in Poland, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent an urgent message to the Chinese Communist Party in late October, 1956, asking for immediate talks with Chinese delegates. On the very day when riots erupted in Budapest, a delegation of the Chinese Communist Party led by Liu Shaoqi arrived in Moscow for negotiations. Liu conveyed Mao Zedong’s views and recommended that the Soviet control over Eastern Europe should be lessened, Soviet troops withdrawn, and the Warsaw Pact reorganized. On October 30 the Soviet Government published the “Declaration on Strengthening the Foundation for Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries.” The Declaration stressed that negotiation and agreement should be prerequisite to stationing Soviet troops in any member state of the Warsaw Pact; and that the recipient country should be consulted on the necessity before Soviet advisers were sent there. In January 1957, Zhou Enlai toured Eastern Europe, with view to patching up relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. To some extent, China’s mediation helped to prevent a split between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies.

All these facts show that Sino-Soviet relationship changed from a relation where China was directed and aided by the Soviet Union to an equal one. Without China’s support, the Soviet Union could not have saved its status as “the leader of the socialist world.” In his report to the Central Committee of the CPC about his tour of Eastern European countries and interviews with their leaders, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the Sino-Soviet relationship was quite different from what it had been under the Stalinist regime; “China is in a position to discuss any problems with the Soviets on an equal basis. When they disagree upon some important issues, Soviet comrades would turn to us for consultation.”⁸

At this moment when Sino-USSR negotiations about whether to provide China with nuclear aid were going on, the Soviet Union had undergone a sudden change in domestic politics: Malenkov and Molotov called a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and schemed to remove Khrushchev from the position of the first secretary of the Party. But their “coup d’état” failed totally. At the end of June, the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union voted for “Decision on the Anti-Party Group of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich;” Malenkov and his conspirators were expelled from the Party. Later, Khrushchev, deeply

worried about the increasing influence of Defense Minister, Marshal Zhukov, who had given him key support against the coup, relieved him of his ministry. In 1953, at the time of the debate about whether to provide China with nuclear aid, the power struggle around the issue of successor to Stalin had entered the final stage.

Khrushchev was then not influential in either other socialist countries or Soviet domestic politics. For him, offering China some nuclear aid to strengthen the Soviet Union and his power foundation seemed to be a good yet risky “bait of aid.” In any case, it seems clear that China-Soviet negotiations over nuclear aid throw some light on the relations between socialist countries and also on Soviet domestic politics. And it seems logical that this rash and unnatural decision, the first of its kind made by the Soviet Union⁹ and one that exerted tremendous impact upon the international community, led to “an abrupt halt” in Soviet aid one and a half year later. On June 20, 1959, just before talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom about stopping nuclear tests and the summit between American and Soviet top leaders, the Soviet Union unilaterally halted transfer of the atomic bomb model and design technology to China, on the excuse that “if Western countries know that the Soviet Union is giving China the atomic bomb model and technology, then efforts by socialist countries to ease international tension would be in vain.” Later, the Soviet government notified China that “the decision will not be made until Western countries’ attitude towards banning nuclear tests and international détente is known.”¹⁰

III. Suggestions and Disputes on Long-wave Radio Stations and a Joint Fleet

From 1958 to 1959 China and the Soviet Union were embroiled in a series of serious disputes over issues like building long-wave radio stations and a joint fleet, suspending nuclear technology aid, the Taiwan Straits Crisis and the Sino-Indian conflict. The Sino-Soviet alliance was in deep trouble. Specifically, it was Soviet proposal to build long-wave radio stations and a joint fleet that caused Beijing’s mistrust of the Soviet Union, which was largely responsible for the Sino-Soviet split.

The project of long-wave radio stations was firstly mentioned in a letter to Peng Dehuai by Malinovski, the Soviet Defense Minister, on April 18, 1958. The Soviet Union made it clear that the Soviet government could assume 70% of the one-hundred-million-rouble expenditure and that the Soviet Navy would have access to them when they were built. Peng consulted Mao Zedong and replied on June 12 that China could not accept the condition that the Soviet Union had the ownership of the stations, but preferred that China should bear all the expense and have the ownership, and that the conditions for sharing should be negotiated between the two governments. The issue was temporarily settled when the defense ministers of the two countries signed an agreement upon the funds for station construction during the meeting between Mao and Khrushchev.

The issue of a joint fleet was brought up when China asked for aid for its newly-built navy. On June 18, 1958, Marshal Nie Rongzhen summoned a group to draw up a plan, arguing that “in view of national defense and security, we will have to develop autonomously nuclear submarines that would be able to launch missiles.” Nie then submitted the plan to Peng Dehuai, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong one after another for consideration. On June 28, Zhou

“accepted the proposal from the Defense Ministry, and wrote to ask Khrushchev to provide technological assistance in manufacturing nuclear submarines and speed boats.” On July 21, the Soviet ambassador to Beijing, Pavel Yudin, brought Khrushchev’s message to Mao Zedong, formally inviting China to set up a joint fleet with the Soviet Union. The Soviet suggestion angered Mao. He complained bitterly to Yudin, “You don’t trust Chinese; you only trust the Russians. Are the Russians superior and the Chinese inferior? ...Is it possible for us to pool our armies, air forces, and industry and agriculture? You want us to subject our 10-thousand-kilometer coastline to your military protection, and leave our army only capable of fighting guerrilla wars? Do you plan to practice nuclear monopoly and demarcate a couple of Soviet concessions in China?” On knowing Mao was angry, Khrushchev hurried to Beijing for a talk. Mao told Khrushchev plainly that China wanted nothing but Soviet technological aid; if the Soviet Union desired “merging,” then China would take back its request.

According to some archives like the *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*, there existed some direct channels or channels created by the soviet military advisors in China for communication between the Soviet and Chinese armies. The Soviets often sounded out China’s intentions as to the long-length wave station and joint fleet through these channels and China also made its responses through them. For example, it was through these channels that Peng Dehuai exchanged correspondence with Malinovski. The agreement on construction of long-length wave stations was also drafted and delivered to Peng Dehuai by the Soviet Union through these channels. It was Soviet military advisers who first suggested China should ask for technical assistance in its development of nuclear submarines and speedboats; now that the Soviet-China Agreement (October 1957) had promised sharing atomic bomb technology, that would definitely be no problem. It follows that Soviet military advisers and the Chinese army had then communicated with each other in terms of strategic cooperation. It is conceivable that it was the interests of the two armies that contributed a lot to mutual understanding. While the Chinese military authorities strongly hoped to strengthen its navy, and especially to possess a navy with nuclear capability, to tackle the problem of Taiwan, the Soviet army that had no long-range missiles to strike the eastern part of the United States was in desperate need of cooperation from China’s navy, long-length wave stations in Chinese territory and a joint fleet.

In November 1957, a Chinese military delegation led by Nie Rongzhen and including top military leaders like Ye Jianying and Su Yu went to visit the Soviet Union during Mao Zedong’s sojourn in Moscow. The purpose of this visit was to have “some significant things” in Sino-Soviet military cooperation carried out. China hoped to discuss such issues as nuclear industry construction, development of nuclear weapons and missiles, manufacturing of planes and warships and so on. Khrushchev generally approved of China’s request and agreed on cooperation of bilateral military departments. Liu Xiao recalled that the talks of 1957 literally ensured the maintenance of cooperation between the Soviet Navy and Air Force in the Far East and the Chinese Army.¹¹

Here the following points could be summarized about the dispute over the Sino-Soviet military cooperation in 1958.

1) The suggestion of building long-length wave radio stations and a joint fleet constituted an important part of Khrushchev’s new strategy in Asia. From 1955, Khrushchev was seeking

to fuse the Warsaw Pact and Sino-Soviet alliance. In order to obtain military support for his practice of co-existence, Khrushchev tried to extend, institutionalize and re-organize the Sino-Soviet alliance. To integrate it with the Warsaw Pact would be the most important step of this strategy.

2) In October 1957 after the change of Soviet Defense Minister, the Soviet leaders had not reached a consensus about issues including navy construction and navy strategy. It may be justifiably argued that the Soviet military played an active and key role in making an offer of technological help to China, as it advocated the idea of fighting along with the country in the Far East and building a joint army. Khrushchev told Mao Zedong on July 31, 1957 that there was still much disagreement within the Soviet military leadership on naval strategic policy, specifically what kind of navy the Soviet Union needed, and that the Soviet Union wanted to negotiate with China over the methods of joint combat. His words do not sound like an excuse.

3) From 1957 to 1958, Soviet and Chinese military authorities made a variety of efforts to institutionalize their military cooperation. In his last face-to-face talk with Mao Zedong on October 2, 1959, Khrushchev protested that China had not notified the Soviet Union before it assaulted Jinmen and Mazu Islands with heavy artillery fire. Mao refuted this, replying that the PLA General Staff had already conveyed Beijing's views of the Taiwan issue to the Soviet Defense Ministry through the leader of the Soviet Advisory Group in China. Khrushchev retorted that significant international issues should be dealt with through diplomatic channels. This indicates that the channels of communication between the two armies at least were functioning.

After a severe clash between him and Mao in 1958, Khrushchev resolved to stop nuclear aid to China on June 20, 1959, under the pretext that the Soviet Union would be engaged in negotiations with the United States and United Kingdom on banning nuclear tests. Then on July 16, 1960 he notified China that all Soviet experts (including military experts) would be recalled. However, after the Khrushchev-Mao conversations in August 1958, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on technological aid to China's naval equipment (February 4, 1959) and an agreement on expanding economic cooperation (February 7, 1959). Following the cessation of nuclear assistance, Zhou Enlai and Nie Rongzhen had made requests for more aid either to Khrushchev directly or through diplomatic channels. In July 1960, Chinese came to realize that they had minimal chances of getting nuclear technological aid from the Soviets. The departure of Soviet experts gave a decisive blow to China's development of nuclear energy and weaponry. It was not until July 1961 that the Chinese became determined to rely upon their own ability to make atomic bombs.

The Sino-Soviet alliance was a comprehensive one that touched a variety of fields like ideology, security, national interests, models of socialist construction etc. The alliance set out to work as a very special mechanism for safeguarding all-around security. This study tries to analyze one aspect of the alliance by starting with national security and focusing on the transformation of Sino-Soviet relationship from friendliness to hostility. As to the military cooperation between the two nations, the author could not make a sound judgment due to shortage of first-hand material. However, the following three points seem to be an appropriate in concluding this thesis.

First, Sino-Soviet military alliance, which was constantly shaped by the international situation and Soviet foreign policy, entered a stage of institutionalization and readjustment from 1957 to 1958. The impetus for such change was given by Khrushchev and the Soviet military authorities who advocated the pursuit of an active strategy in Asia. Some of the top military leaders of China including Peng Dehuai showed a similar strategic inclination. However, because of opposition from Mao Zedong, who cherished strong nationalist feelings against the United States and the Soviet Union, the institutionalization and readjustment of the Sino-Soviet military alliance ended in failure and deep crisis.

Second, the Sino-Soviet alliance was expected to be permanent and comprehensive, but it was actually asymmetrical and fragile in terms of military and economic power. Strategically, China was looking forward to settling the Taiwan problem while the Soviet Union intended to maintain the status quo. China expected to establish a definite and functional alliance with the Soviet Union, taking such an alliance as a way to secure safety insurance and aid while the Soviets were keen on a long-term objective of creating a loose economic and military "community."

Third, as far as an all-around alliance is concerned, the member states need to have at least common goals, interests and strategies; consistent leadership and stable domestic politics would also be indispensable to the maintenance of such alliance. However, as this study has showed, to strengthen the Sino-Soviet alliance (namely, provide China with nuclear technological aid) was an expedient yet risky decision that was made in 1958 due to a tough internal power struggle in the Soviet leadership and Khrushchev's craving to enhance the Soviet Union's international reputation. The Sino-Soviet dispute over the joint fleet in 1958 mirrors the disagreements among the Chinese leaders, as well as Soviet leaders, over foreign and military strategies.

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Notes

1. Shi Zhe, *Along with Great Men: An Interpreter's Memoir*, Central Party School Press, 1988, pp. 572-573.
2. "Selected Documents about Developing Nuclear Energy and Opposing Use of Nuclear Weapons," *Party's Archives*, 1994, vol. 3.
3. Dai Chaowu, "China's Development of Nuclear Weapons and Sino-Soviet Split" in *Contemporary History of China*, 2001, vol. 3.
4. As to the negotiation of the agreement upon new technology for national defense, see Zhou Junlun, ed., *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*, People's Press, 1999, pp. 618-623. See also Dai Chaowu, "China's Development of Nuclear Weapons and Sino-Soviet Split," 2001.
5. Li Jue et al., ed., *Nuclear Industry of China*, China Social Science Press, 1987, p. 30.
6. Vladislav Zubuk & Constatine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War — From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 227.
7. Liu Xiao, *Eight Years in Soviet Union as Envoy*, CPC Party History Press, 1986, pp. 8-13.
8. Zhou Enlai, report to the CPC Central Committee, January 24, 1957, in Shen Zhihua, ed. and trans., *Archives of Sino-Soviet Relations* (unpublished), p. 51.
9. Pervukhin, then a Soviet responsible for concluding the agreement upon new technology for national defense, once said, "It is the first time in Soviet diplomatic history that the Soviet Union has signed such kind of agreement, because China is a most reliable and trustworthy friend." (See *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*, vol. 1, p. 620) Pervukhin was the most important figure in Soviet nuclear technological research, but he was demoted from full member to alternate member of the Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party, as he was suspected involved in the failed coup against Khrushchev. Here it can be argued that the negotiation of this agreement was largely shaped by the power struggle within the Soviet Union. Even, whether Khrushchev himself had ever mentioned giving China nuclear technological aid remains an unanswered yet essential question.
10. See *Chronology of Nie Rongzhen*, vol. 2, p. 680. Besides, it has been recorded that 233 Soviet nuclear experts withdrew from China two months later, taking away all important blueprints and data; meanwhile, the Soviet government cut off the supply of the equipment and material concerned. (See *Nuclear Industry of Contemporary China*, p. 33) Thus, China did not obtain any significant data about nuclear weapon and the sample of atomic bomb from the Soviet Union.
11. Liu Xiao, *Eight Years in Soviet Union as Envoy*, pp. 60-61.