
L. I. Brezhnev's Report at the Crimean meeting, 30 July 1973

[Source: Central State Archive, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 35, File 4300]

Personal! Top secret!

REPORT

Of Comrade LEONID ILYCH BREZHNEV at the meeting of the leaders of the socialist countries'
communist and working parties in Crimea

July 30-31st 1973

Dear Comrades!

Allow me once again to welcome you cordially and to express my pleasure that we are together again. The members of the CC CPSU Politburo asked me to convey to all of you friendly greetings and wishes for success of our meeting.

We meet in such unofficial atmosphere for the third time already - in this way a good tradition is being established. We see the great importance of these comradely meetings. They give us an opportunity in business atmosphere and without committing ourselves to formalities, to discuss important issues for the solving of which we are working together. Besides, we all have an additional opportunity for mutual talks.

In short, our meetings, as we believe, are useful in every respect. And, of course, they allow us to coordinate our moves at the international scene, to suggest new ideas, to consolidate the solidarity and the unity of the socialist countries - our most important and most cherished conquest.

I. RESULTS OF THE COMMON POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DURING THE LAST YEAR

As you remember, during the last meeting in Crimea we discussed the issues of the international policy of our parties and countries. We spoke not only about the common perspectives of the struggle for peace and socialism, but we specified the tasks about whose solving we are going to work together.

At the foreground we placed the European problems: the ensuring of the international legal status of the German Democratic Republic, the normalizing of the relationships between Czechoslovakia and the Federal Republic of Germany, multilateral consultations for the preparation of the European Conference. Besides, there was an exchange of views, though in a general plan, on the issue of decreasing the forces in Europe. After that we defined the basic lines of our policy in respect of the biggest capitalist countries - the USA, FRG and France, we agreed on how to act to big international problems and first of all to the problem of Vietnam, having in mind to cooperate for the successful completion of the negotiations in Paris.

What are the results? Without unnecessary modesty you and we, Comrades, can rightfully say that we advanced significantly in the realization of our common line concerning the international interests.

[...]

It can be said most definitely that such positive results we couldn't have achieved without the coordination of the activities of all brotherly countries. In connection with this I would like to note especially the internationalist position of Bulgaria and Hungary in respect of the establishment of diplomatic relations with FRG which to a great extent contributed to the solving of the problems.

The main thing that we achieved as a result of our common policy regarding FRG consists in this that the government of this country and the great majority of its population practically have acknowledged that it is impossible to change the results of the Second World War. The Germany, which claimed to subdue Europe and the whole world, doesn't exist today and if we act as we did up to now, actively and in solidarity, it will never exist again.

[...]

We took into consideration all this during my recent visit to the FRG. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union informed all of you, Comrades, about the basic contents of our talks with the Federal Chancellor, as well as about the talks with Nixon and Pompidou. Everything, upon which we agreed in Bonn, is a common knowledge from the published documents. Therefore, allow me to concentrate only on particular moments of our talks with the government of FRG.

Being in Bonn, we felt that the West Germans intended to prolong the work of the European Conference. Therefore, during the conversations with Brandt was posed a question - by all means the work at the Conference to be completed in 1973. After certain hesitation, Brandt said that the FRG would agree with this. As far as the third stage of the Conference was concerned, Brandt on principle agreed to take part in it, although he placed this depending on the results which will be achieved during the second stage.

Brandt expressed willingness to look for mutual understanding with us at the negotiations on the problem for reduction of the armed forces in Europe, as well. But altogether his position on these issues was, I would say, evasive. Possibly, this is linked with the circumstance that the question for the reduction of the armed forces is still discussed in NATO.

[...]

And now, about the visit to the United States of America, undertaken by me on decision of the CC CPSU Politburo in June this year together with Comrade Gromyko and other our comrades. The very atmosphere of the visit, my negotiations with President Nixon, the signing of a series of new political, economical and other agreements between USSR and the USA - all this, it can be said, as though establishes a new stage in the development of the Soviet-American relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

The documents signed by us in America are well known. All of them are published and there were no secret agreements whatsoever.

[...]

The contradictions between the USA and the other imperialistic countries in Europe and Asia, the complicated situation of the Nixon administration inside the country due to the intensified struggle between

the parties and the political fractions - all this reinforced the interest of Nixon of achieving positive results in the negotiations with the USSR and established favorable prerequisites for the realization of the plans outlined by us.

The practical work on the preparation of the respective documents began long before the very visit, actually, immediately after the Moscow meeting with Nixon. As a result of this, till the beginning of the visit, the texts of the respective branch agreements were prepared. The most important is that we managed to achieve Nixon to accept the idea suggested by us for an agreement to prevent the nuclear war and to come to terms for such a text in this agreement which, although a compromise at certain moments, not so clearly and specifically formulates the responsibilities of the countries, as we would like it to do, but fully corresponds with our basic concept and our political goals, which we associate with this document.

[...]

Main place in the results of the visit takes, of course, the Agreement for prevention of the menace of a nuclear war. Journalists like bombastic words but I think that when this agreement is called in the press of the socialist and the so called bourgeois countries "historical", "a landmark", "a symbol for the end of the Cold War" and so on, here, probably there is no great exaggeration. It really has an enormous significance.

[...]

In our efforts for improving the political climate in Europe, a big role play our relations with France. With the arrangement of the Soviet-French cooperation, so to say, began a turning point in the détente and the improvement of the relations between the East and the West on the European continent.

The development of the relations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries with France facilitates the solving not only of the European, but also of broader tasks of our foreign policy, since France occupies an outstanding place in the capitalist world.

Our meetings with Pompidou in Zaslavl and Rambouillet included approximately the same range of themes: the European affairs, the situation in Vietnam, in the Near East, the relations with America and China. Even for this short period of time, which separated the two meetings, life brought in a lot of new moments.

One of these moments was our dialogue with Nixon, which visibly disturbed the French. From the talks with Pompidou I got the impression that he was concerned mostly with the political aspect - won't the attitude of the Soviet Union towards France change for the worse? I had to explain to Pompidou in a relevant way that the agreements with the USA do not affect the interests of other countries, especially those with France, with which we established certain relations in the political, economical and cultural spheres.

[...]

During the talks with Pompidou we expressed our attitude to some negative moments in the policy of France, too. In particular, we repeated that we could not understand why the government of France avoids the negotiations on the issues of disarmament... Pompidou declared that in the current circumstances, a reduction of the French armed forces is out of the question. The French obviously are inclined to go on increasing their

nuclear and conventional weapons and they do not intend to curtail the tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. We can hardly rely that they easily will betray their views on the issues of disarmament. Welcoming not long ago here, in Crimea, the Foreign Minister of France, Joubert, I again turned his attention to the inconsistency of the position of France on these matters.

It is very useful that together with us in the same period, the other socialist countries also undertook a series of important actions in their relations with the outstanding capitalist countries. I mean especially the visits of Comrade Zhivkov and Gierek in France, the welcoming to the State Secretary of the USA Rogers by Comrades Kadar and Husak, the meeting of Comrade Honecker with Wener, the talks of Comrade Zhivkov and Kadar with the Prime Minister of France. Comrade Ceausescu, as it is well known, also paid visits to Italy and the FRG.

[...]

For a major achievement of our coordinated policy we justifiably can consider the beginning of the work of the European Conference. This is especially evident, if we remember the obviously negative reaction of the West regarding our first motions for the Conference.

Our countries implement a line the measures for the improvement of the political situation in Europe to be supplemented with measures in the sphere of military détente. The initiative for the practical treatment of the problem for mutual reduction of the armed forces and arms in Central Europe belongs to the socialist countries. It is true, that on behalf of some Western countries are being made attempts the problem to be presented in such a way as if not we but they make us to sit on the table of negotiations. But this is a bizarre "smoke curtain". In reality, in a series of West-European capitals and in the NATO headquarters they are afraid that these negotiations may turn against them, that they can increase the centrifugal tendencies in NATO and to lead to weakening of the military-political positions of the West.

I think that our countries can be pleased with the results from the consultations in Vienna. We succeeded in achieving the issue about the structure of the participants in the future agreements to be determined in accordance with the interests of the security of the socialist community. Other issues, referring to the organization of the forthcoming negotiations, are also settled.

After the end of the European Conference, the issue for the reduction of the armies will perhaps become a focus of the next stage of the struggle for the consolidation of security in Europe. This will become an important, long-term tendency of the foreign policy activities of the countries from the socialist community. In fact, for the first time in history of the European continent, as well as of the whole world, the task for the reduction of arms and disarmament is set on a practical basis. And everybody sees that this is merit first of all of the socialist countries.

The negotiations, of course, will be difficult and we have to be justifiably prepared for them. It is clear that for us it disadvantageous and risky to undertake whatever steps which can shake the positions of socialism in the center of Europe. It is impending to our Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to work hard on the development of the line on the essence of the problem; we have to carry out relevant consultations, too. We have to develop a clear, specific and convincing position.

[...]

When a balance is made, it can confidently be said that due to joint efforts last year we succeeded in achieving major changes in the international situation in general. Now really a radical turning point is being implemented, the period of "the Cold War" is changing with a new period in the international relations, whose basis is the broad realization of the principles of the peaceful co-existence.

[...]

II. ABOUT SOME BASIC TENDENCIES IN OUR FUTURE FOREIGN POLICY

Comrades,

We achieved serious results in the international détente. Now we have to use this détente and overcoming the resistance of its opponents, to make it irreversible.

Now in our relations with the major capitalist countries in basic outlines is established a system of treaties and agreements which contains the necessary legal frames for the development of the relations of the peaceful co-existence with these countries.

[...]

The countries of NATO implement rearmament of their forces with regard to the scientific and technical progress. They emphasize mainly on the quality of the armament. Carrying out from time to time even a certain qualitative reduction of the armed forces, the military and the political leaders of NATO endeavor to increase significantly the destructive power of their weapons. All this obliges us constantly to be on the alert, to take care of the necessary state of our armed forces - of all together and of each national army separately. I have already talked on this topic with the comrades Kadar, Husak, Gierek, Honecker and Ceausescu. I think that this issue deserves our common attention. Our defensive power plays far from last role in the successes of our foreign policy, too. We have to increase it further.

[...]

As the messages of our ambassadors in the Western countries testify, the signing of a Soviet-American agreement for prevention of a nuclear war brought in major dissension in the camp of NATO, caused new a strain in the contradictions among the European NATO member states and the United States. The soothing assurances of Washington can not obliterate the irritation of London and the suspicions of Paris.

As you see, our positive moves, aimed at development of the cooperation with separate Western countries, also have this peculiarity that sometimes they intensify the contradictions in the imperialistic camp.

I would like to concentrate on the issue of the situation in Indo-China.

It is clear for all of us that the situation in Vietnam and generally in Indo-China remains complicated... The issues concerning the situation in Vietnam and the tasks which confront the people of Vietnam at the new

stage - a stage of the struggle for consolidation of the results of its historical victory, were discussed by us not long ago with the party-governmental delegation of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Vietnamese leaders visited and intend to visit also some other socialist countries. Having in mind this circumstance, I will broach here only some key issues, on which it is important for us to consult.

The leaders of Vietnam point out that at the moment the central problem is the complete and unconditional fulfillment of the Paris agreement. We are entirely in favor of this position.

[...]

The Vietnamese comrades rely on receiving help from the socialist countries for the reconstruction of the devastated by the war people's economics of the country. They are interested in establishment of business connections with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Isn't it worth in connection with this to think about a coordination of our work on rendering help to Democratic Republic of Vietnam, including through COMECON as well?

On our behalf we endeavored, as much as we can, to grant the requests of DRV for economic aid. In our striving to relieve its economic situation, we, as you know, have adopted a decision to consider free our aid to the Vietnamese comrades. We agreed to render them assistance in the development of the plans of reconstruction of the people's economy.

[...]

Our Politburo showed understanding about the necessity of consolidation of the defensive ability of DRV and the South-Vietnamese patriots. Nevertheless, we underlined that the measures undertaken to that effect, must not give grounds for accusations in breach of the Paris agreement, because it could be used by Saigon or by the Americans for its failure.

[...]

The situation in two other countries in Indo-China - Laos and Cambodia - has its specifics and its complexities. In Laos, are being held negotiations among the major political fractions and the process of normalization advances, although slowly.

In Cambodia, as you know, the military operations go on. The USA hasn't cut off their military support for the regime in Phnom-Penh and the bombing of the positions of the patriotic forces continue. Generally, the situation in Cambodia is vague. Different powers interact there. Sianuk is in China and this can not but influence his positions. The Vietnamese comrades, retaining their relations with "the red Khmers", support Sianuk at the same time. The USA, on their part, make attempts to achieve some agreement with the Chinese.

Based on our principal line for support of the Cambodian patriots, we made some moves with the goal for further development of the contacts with representatives of the National Unified Front of Cambodia (NUFC), and also for establishing, with the help of the Vietnamese friends, of direct connections with the Cambodian

People's Revolutionary Party. Possibly, depending on the course of the events, we'll have to think about for additional moves, too.

We have to acknowledge, comrades, that the situation in the Middle East continues to be complicated and dangerous for the world peace.

[...]

The hatred towards the conquerors in the Arab world continues to grow and at any moment it can find an outlet in the form of military outbreak. We have bear in mind that in the policy of the Arab countries sensitively is manifested the influence of the petty bourgeoisie, characteristic with its fluctuations from ultra-revolutionarism to pessimism and decline of morale.

Among the Arab countries, like before, there is no unity on the political, nor on the strategic issues, which significantly weakens their positions in the conflict with Israel.

[...]

Our major and decisive interest consists in this to cooperate for the establishment in the Middle East - in this important geographical region, at that so near to our boundaries - of a lasting and long-term peace.

[...]

As you know, during our recent negotiations with Nixon, we tried to render strong pressure on him on the issue of the Middle East, pointing out how explosive and endangering the calmness and the peace in whole world is the situation in this region. At the negotiations about the problem in the Middle East were dedicated a lot of hours. But Nixon, although his denial in words, obviously feels too dependent on the pro-Israeli circles in the United States in order to undertake in the current situation something decisive to influence the position of Israel, although deep in his soul he, probably, understands the danger of the situation.

Nevertheless, we succeeded in one respect to advance a little the position of the Americans, making them in the text of a common communiqué, signed by Nixon and me, to acknowledge the legal interests of the people of Palestine.

To the intricacy of the situation are added the instability of Sadat and the rashness of a number of his acts. It is enough to remind you that he rejected the serious political trump which was in his hands - the presence on the Egypt territory of Soviet military personnel, invited there by an initiative of President Nasser and Sadat himself. In exchange of the withdrawal of these personnel, he could have obtained substantial allowances from the Americans and Israel. But Sadat, with his impulsiveness and self-will, did not want to take into consideration all this.

I'll tell you straightforward, comrades, we granted Sadat's request for the withdrawal of our people without any difficulties for ourselves. On the contrary, there was a certain plus in this, because the risk of involving the Soviet Union in direct military confrontation with the USA as a result of some irresponsible actions of

that same Sadat was diminished. But the fact remains: Sadat, Egypt and the whole Arab world lost a lot with this in political aspect.

[...]

The Arabian leaders instigate each other, and their people, as well, and inflame belligerent emotions. At the background of all this we have to consider possible the resumption of the war practically at any time. We, on our part, did a lot in order to avert the explosion. We exercised influence in this direction on the leaders of Egypt and Syria and we organized our military shipments for these countries, so that to help for the consolidation of their defense, but not to give reasons for adventurous moves. For now, we managed to avoid an explosion but who knows how much longer this will go on?

If the war in the Middle East is resumed, it will be difficult to foresee how it will end. From our contacts with the Arabs it is clear that they themselves do not envision clearly the consequences of it. In any case, the whole international situation will aggravate and a lot of constructive plans will be breached. Obviously, all this is not in our interest.

[...]

Comrades, life itself prompts the conclusion for the increase of the role of the Asian tendency in the international policy. The assistance for consolidation of the powers of peace and the international cooperation in this very important region is not an easy task.

[...]

On the collective security in Asia: This concept is already introduced by the socialist countries as an international term.

Now it is important insistently, although without unnecessary rashness, to move forward the idea of collective security and to specify its contents.

[...]

The Chinese leaders declare themselves against our proposal for collective security in Asia. We must decisively denounce the slander that the collective security means a "surrounding of China" and will be used against the legal interests of the People's Republic of China or any other country.

Of course, to all of us it is clear that the creation of a system for collective security in Asia is an intricate and not immediate work. But its implementation would mean an important advance in the whole situation in the world. And it is worth to work on this issue, as well, exercising influence on broader and broader masses of people in all Asian countries.

Increasing attentions on our part require the social and political processes, which are growing in Latin America. The dimension of the anti-imperialistic struggle on this continent is expanding and more countries are involved in the stream of the movement for independence and social progress. However, all these

processes take place in situation of intense struggle and constant attempts of the local reaction together with the support of the USA to gain revenge. For all this sufficiently convincingly speak the events in countries like Chile, Peru, Argentina, Panama and Uruguay.

The development of the Chilean revolution has already become one of the main political factors in the whole world and exercises significant influence on the mood of the masses and the positions of the political parties in many countries... For us, the socialist countries, the support for the Chilean revolution has already become a close to all of us cause and obviously in the future we will continue to fulfil our duty as communists-internationalists in this respect. It is very well that we have, it can be said, complete mutual understanding with the leaders of the Chilean Communist Party and with the state authorities in this country in the person of President Allende. Not long ago we granted the request of the Chilean government for shipment of some arms. We hope that this will help for the consolidation of the position of the Unidad Popular government.

We think that the progressive nationalistic leaders of countries like Peru and Panama deserve careful attitude and sensible support on our part.

We would like to express a wish for establishing a certain coordination of our activities in Latin America. It would not be bad if representatives of the international departments carry out in the near future consultations on the issues of the situation in Latin America and about the policy of our countries. Of course, very valuable in such consultations would be the participation of Cuba, which plays an active and important role in the Latin American affairs.

[...]

The changes for the better in the international climate allow us to pose on the agenda the task for activation of the struggle for termination of the race in the armament, for disarmament, including, in view of the agreements between the USSR and the USA, for the prevention of nuclear war.

[...]

In connection with this, naturally, arises the question: is it possible for a long time to be kept such a situation, when two nuclear powers reduce their strategic armaments, but others increase them? It must be said that lately the Chinese and the French, too, do this in a very defiant way, demonstratively, without taking into consideration the protests of the international community and of the governments of many countries.

Obviously, this situation can not go on infinitely. In our view we have to deploy a broad campaign for exercising serious pressure on the other nuclear countries and to exploit the fact for the negotiations between the USSR and the USA for cessation of the rivalry in the strategic armament. It is important to mobilize all political means in order to make them join the process of limitation of the nuclear rocket armament. Comrades, now this becomes a pressing task.

[...]

III. ACTUAL ISSUES OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

Let me stress now on some principal issues of the cooperation between our countries.

[...]

The basis of the whole system of cooperation among the brotherly countries is the party relationships. Our Politburo appreciates highly the recently established forms of relations between the leaders of our parties, which include not only official visits and negotiations but also operative meetings on certain issues.

[...]

In our system of international political cooperation a main place occupies the organization of the Warsaw Pact. With the help of this organization we defended all conquests of the socialist revolutions - this is the main result of the activities of the Warsaw Pact which has to be celebrated when our organization turns twenty. It will happen in two years.

In the present state of affairs, when there is no real progress in the sphere of disarmament and the work still has not reached the stage of eliminating of the military blocks of the imperialistic countries, our task is to sustain constantly the necessary level of the defense of the socialist community, to perfect the political and the military mechanism of the organization of the Warsaw Pact.

Now we are moving confidently towards the solving of the tasks, which were formulated in the preamble of the Warsaw Pact - towards establishing a system for European security. Probably the comrades will agree that a necessity is ripe for holding the successive meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in order to discuss the course of the European Conference, and also to propose new political initiatives referring to the European affairs.

At the last meeting of the Political Consultative Committee an extensive support found the idea for improvement the mechanism of political cooperation within the bounds of the Warsaw Pact. Probably, this, too, can become a topic for discussion and solving at the forthcoming session of the PCC. Possibly, our Ministers of Defense should be invited and given a hearing. As far as the date for summoning of the PCC is concerned, about this we can reach an agreement later, in view of the development of the European events.

I would like to say a few words about the development of the relations with the brotherly countries, which are situated far from us but are inseparable links of the world socialist system.

In this respect, all of us have done a significant work recently. It is enough to recall the visits of the comrades Zhivkov, Tsedenbal and Husak in Cuba, the visit of Comrade Husak in Mongolia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the meeting and the negotiations of other leading functionaries of our countries with the Vietnamese, Cuban and Korean leaders.

As you know, an agreement was reached about my visit to Cuba. We rely on conducting with Fidel thorough discussions not only on the issues of the Soviet-Cuban cooperation, but also on pressing issues of the common line of the socialist countries in the international affairs. This visit, especially after the visit in the USA, undoubtedly will be useful as a political support of the Cubans, as well, and will become a manifestation of our unflinching solidarity with brotherly Cuba.

All of us understand the importance of the further solicitation to the common line of the socialist countries of the DPRK. Now its leaders took up a course to peaceful democratic unification of the country. By the way, the expediency of such a course was mentioned during our meetings with Kim Il-Sung a few years ago. The DPRK needs our support and nevertheless the well known to us moments in the policy of the Korean Labor Party, we consider it our responsibility to render it such a support. Implementing a correspondence with the Korean comrades, sending to Pyongyang leading CPSU experts and receiving in Moscow members of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party, we aim to pave the way for closer and more extensive cooperation of the DPRK with our countries, which undoubtedly corresponds to the interests of the people of Korea and also of the world socialism.

A few words about Albania: Probably nobody of you is interested the tense and even hostile relations with this country to go on infinitely. Let's think what we can undertake in the current situation for normalizing of the situation and who is going to do it? We can act deploying different methods, but the most important is our policy to be coordinated.

[...]

Here we do not have the opportunity to discuss in detail concrete economical issues. Today I will allow myself only briefly to focus on two problems, which particularly worry us at the moment. First of all, this is the problem for the fuel and the raw materials. We know very well how acutely this problem now with our friends stands. We have undertaken and we will undertake all possible measures to aid them as much as we can. But you must understand, comrades, that even our capacities are limited.

[...]

IV. THE FOREIGN POLICY LINE OF THE CHINESE LEADERS AND THE WORLD POLITICS

Estimating the perspectives of the struggle for consolidation of peace and strengthening of the international positions of socialism, it is necessary to full extent to bear in mind the Chinese factor in the world policy.

With the sweeping entry of the People's Republic of China on the international arena, the essence of the Chinese policy and its goals did not change, although the forms and the methods of this policy underwent substantial alterations and became more dangerous. The Beijing leaders, rejecting the "ultra-revolutionary" ideological disguise, literally on all lines declare themselves as a power, hostile to the policy and the interests of the socialist world; besides, they become more often direct allies of the most reactionary imperialistic circles.

[...]

Particularly insistently the Beijing politicians and propagandists spread the thesis for "two superpowers" which allegedly made an agreement and want to impose their will on all other countries. This false thesis, taken up by anti-Soviet characters of all kinds and background, is the most blazing proof for the full rejection of Beijing of the class principles in the international policy, for their full breach with Marxism-Leninism, for their full retreat from the common policy of the socialist countries.

[...]

Comrades, for the course of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations on the issues of the boundary, we briefed you not long ago. As it is obvious, the Chinese used the negotiations as a screen to disguise their hostile to the Soviet Union policy. Possibly, we shall have to make the relevant conclusions from this.

[...]

V. ISSUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

[...]

Recently, representatives of brotherly parties more and more often express the idea for the expediency of joint discussion of new problems. Comrade Berlinguer proposed a new meeting of the Communist parties of all Europe, like the one in Karlovy Vary. You know about this. Comrade Jespersen expressed a similar thought even earlier. As far as we know, the French, the Austrian, the Belgian and the English comrades confirmed this idea. In a word, it has already received definite acknowledgment.

If we principally agree to support this idea, then obviously we shall have to ask the secretaries of the Central Committees of our parties to prepare together with respective representatives of brotherly parties from Western Europe more concrete proposals in this issue. Probably it is best to hold such a meeting after the completion of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

[...]

However, it will hardly be correct the international activity of the communist movement to be limited in the frames of regional meetings. In our view, time has come to consider a new world meeting of the communists. And the regional meetings could practically become preparation stages to the common meeting.

[...]

We would like to hear the opinion of the comrades on all these issues.

[...]

[Translated by Julia Cherneva; Edited by Dr. Jordan Baev]