Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation
The term "Sino-Soviet military cooperation" is narrowly defined here as the cooperation of both sides during times of war, or ensuring national security by carrying out national defense plans and organizing joint military operations in times of peace. It does not include more common executed mutual assistance and cooperation; such as the exchange of military technologies, offers of weapons and equipment, and military training. In this sense, from the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), to the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet alliance was expressed wholly in terms of military significance. The joint military actions within that period materialized mainly through the assistance of the Soviet air force helping Chinese communist troops rapidly occupy Xinjiang, assisting China with the implementation of coastal air defense, and safeguarding the Volunteer Army's supply lines. This military cooperation clearly was very significant to the consolidation of the new Chinese regime.
After the Korean War, China entered a period of peaceful construction, focusing on economic development. While implementing comprehensive economic assistance to China, the Soviets also wished to increase military cooperation, consolidate the eastern border of the socialist camp, and strategically insure Soviet national security. Concomitantly China, in the process of mobilizing national strength for economic construction, required Soviet military assistance and Soviet military power to ensure national defense and consolidate the regime. Due to ideological differences and dissimilar viewpoints on internal relations of the socialist camp, the Sino-Soviet relationship, from its "honeymoon period" to the Sino-Soviet split, failed as both sides, even in a peaceful environment, were unable to achieve successful cooperation. In this respect, both Khrushchev's and Mao's personalities played a major role.
This paper analyzes three aspects of Sino-Soviet military cooperation in the late 1950s; the Far Eastern Air Defense Agreement, the construction of the long-wave radio station, and the proposal for establishing a combined fleet. In past studies of Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese scholars have created a large body of work focusing on the long-wave radio station and combined fleet, largely based on Chinese documents. Their conclusions have been somewhat simplistic: the Soviets wanted to control China. This paper on the contrary, combines newly declassified Soviet documents with the memoirs of former Soviet participants, and objectively analyzes the historical background, the causes behind these issues, and the responses from leaders on both sides. As a result, this paper presents some views which deviate from past analyses.
The Desire for Mutual Cooperation and the Rise of Soviet Chauvinism
After Stalin's death, Khrushchev readjusted the Soviet Union's policies toward China, as he struggled for the leadership of the USSR, both accelerating and increasing the pace of assistance. Sino-Soviet relations entered a "honeymoon period," as both sides actively expressed a desire to cooperate economically, diplomatically, and politically. However, despite the needs and desires of both sides, Sino-Soviet military cooperation surprisingly did not develop on the basis of mutual support during the Korean War.
In January 1955, the Soviet Defense Department proposed that the two countries increaseair defense cooperation in the far east. China immediately dispatched a 9 member delegation to Khabarovsk on January 24 to discuss this proposal with the Soviet Far Eastern Military District and the Pacific Fleet. Chen Geng, Vice Chief of Staff, Wang Bingzhang, Vice Commander of the Air Force, and Cheng Jun, Vice Commander of the Air Defense Army, were included in this delegation. On February 6, both sides signed the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, Pacific Fleet, and Chinese PLA Shenyang Military District Joint Air Defense Agreement, composed of three documents concerning the following topics: 1. A Coordinated military plan to intercept cross-border enemy aircraft. 2. The execution of a plan to practice coordinated air defense. 3. The coordination of air defense plans during times of war. These documents however, were only written in Russian, not Russian and Chinese. Moreover, on the basis of the agreement, the additional intelligence organs and communication facilities established by the Chinese would report to the Soviets in Russian. After Chen and the others in the delegation returned to China to report on the meeting, Peng Dehuai believed that this agreement did not follow international standards, which was to present the context of the agreement in the languages of both sides, and therefore, was unequal. Under these circumstances, Peng suggested that the Central Committee, for the moment, not ratify this agreement.
Though the air defense agreement was tabled, it is not accurate to say the Chinese side was unwilling to proceed with military cooperation. In fact, China's need for air defense cooperation in the Far East was much greater than the Soviet's. The initial problem was merely China's strong dislike of the Soviet military's chauvinism. After the truce in Korea and the Geneva Conference, China was determined to move towards full-scale economic development, which required an international environment that could ensure security and guarantee peace. The emergence of the Warsaw Pact provided for just such an opportunity.
The enlargement and gradual militarization of NATO was evident, and compelled the Soviets to create a counter military organization in Eastern Europe. Whether China raised the issue of participating in the Warsaw Pact remains questionable, but the Soviets did propose to accept China and other non-Europe countries (such as Cuba) into the Warsaw Pact in the following years. Eastern European countries however rejected this motion. At the very least, one could say the Chinese demonstrated a supportive attitude towards safeguarding the collective security of the socialist countries and resisting the military menace of the western camp. On May 12, Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai attended the commencement ceremony of the Warsaw Pact. At the ceremony he said that the series of security treaties between the United States and far eastern countries, as well as the constant American clamoring for war "made the people of Asia, just like the people of the Europe, face the increasingly serious danger of a new war." Therefore, China "will give its full support and cooperation to all resolutions of the Warsaw Pact." Peng, representing the Chinese government at the conference, declared "peace is inseparable." "If the peace in Europe is destroyed," China "will definitely carry out the common anti-aggression war along with the governments and people of our brother countries, until the final victory is achieved." Peng's statement seemed to informally expand China's military commitments, enshrined in the 1950 Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, to the entire socialist camp. Peng also made similar commitments during his brief visits to Eastern European countries before and after the Warsaw conference.
As Peng passed through Moscow on his way to and from the Warsaw meetings, he had in-depth talks with both Khrushchev and Minister of Defense Zhukov. Both sides hoped they could specify plans for military cooperation based on the 1950 treaty. China had the same defense requirements that were stated in the Warsaw Pact, and these were compatible with Khrushchev's ideas on the subject, but differed from the opinions of the Soviet military. Before going abroad on April 29, Peng reported to Mao that he was prepared to discuss with the Soviets how to coordinate military action in the future anti-aggression war. Mao agreed, making clear that the Chinese military strategy was based on an active defense, never a first strike. Peng then brought to Moscow a Ministry of Defense draft concerning Chinese strategy and military policy.
During the talk, Khrushchev spoke frankly to Peng of the strategic significance of the Warsaw Pact forces, their military strength compared to NATO, and the power and effectiveness of newly developed Soviet weapons. He also expressed his willingness to help China develop these types of weapons. When they discussed Soviet policy, Khrushchev said the Warsaw Pact was defensive in nature, and its goal was to promote peace. For this reason, the Soviet Union offered the west an arms reduction proposal, and would unilaterally reduce its own troops in an effort to develop peaceful negotiations, the race toward peace, and an easing of the tension in the international situation. The Soviet Union would withdraw all troops from Austria, despite internal disagreement. Peng expressed his agreement with Khrushchev regarding his views on these international issues, believing that the tension in the international situation needed to be eased, and that China needed a period of peace to carry out reconstruction. Regarding China's relationship with the Warsaw Pact, Khrushchev mentioned twice that the Warsaw Pact was not only aimed at the west, but also the east. He hoped to integrate China and the Warsaw Pact in some fashion. China and the Soviet Union already had an alliance treaty; once the situation changed, that treaty could be implemented and a means of combining this treaty with the Warsaw Pact, or developing the alliance treaty itself could be considered. Presently, the important thing was to consider and research some concrete cooperation topics. The format must be the same as that of the Warsaw Pact, but should be suitable to the situation in the Far East and China, so as to deter the United States from attacking. Khrushchev also said that the Soviet Union had a formidable military force in the Far East and the Pacific, especially regarding air and naval forces. If China desired, the Soviet could cooperate with the Chinese military at anytime and both sides should adopt concrete methods to increase cooperation. Peng said that the Warsaw Pact Conference was a timely, far-sighted, and momentous strategic measure for the present international situation. It was a great contribution towards safeguarding both the security of the socialist countries and world peace, and would also play an important role in the security of Asia and China. Developing the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty, and enhancing military cooperation were good and necessary; socialist countries should cooperate with each other. Peng said that China supported the Soviet Union's international policies, and that China was already reducing its troops in concert with Soviet policy. Regarding military cooperation, Peng said these issues were very important, especially the cooperation of the navy and air force, which would help enhance China's coastal defenses. He would ask the Chinese Communist Part Central Committee (CCP CC) to consider these topics. Khrushchev agreed to increase military assistance to China, and asked Peng to either negotiate with the Soviet Ministry of Defense himself, or send a special delegation to the Soviet Union.
Here we have an issue worthy of note, namely that Khrushchev discussed Soviet internal divisions regarding foreign policy issues [with Peng Dehuai]. At that time, though Khrushchev had successfully removed Malenkov as Chairman of the Minister's Conference, he had not yet consolidated his own position. He did not yet have full control of diplomatic and military issues. Proponents of a hard line foreign policy towards the west not only included Molotov, who was in charge of Soviet foreign affairs, as well as other Eastern European leaders, but also Soviet military leaders. Khrushchev's criticism of Malenkov's argument, "the incalculable destructiveness of nuclear war," the ineffectiveness of a hard line foreign policy and the development of nuclear weapon soon pushed Khrushchev towards a more pragmatic, personal diplomacy. Khrushchev's decision to unilaterally disarm 640,000 troops without prior consultation with his allies, not only elicited doubt from the Eastern European countries, but also fostered strong discontent and passive resistance from the Soviet military. In Khrushchev's opinion, the importance of the Warsaw Pact was symbolic. Its main purpose lay not in military action, but in the current Cold War environment, as a bargaining chip with the west during negotiations. For Molotov however, the Warsaw Pact's strength lay in its role as a military organization and defensive tool, enhancing the cohesion of the socialist camp. The difference was clear in Soviet newspapers: as the party newspaper, Pravda emphasized detente and highly praised Khrushchev's analysis of the European situation, the military newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda, repeated Molotov's warning, that enhancing the defensive powers of the Warsaw Pact countries was necessary in a hostile world. On May 22, when Zhukov and Peng were discussing strategy for the future anti-aggression war, Zhukov articulated this Soviet military opinion. Zhukov thought that China's active defense Strategy was outdated. In the current environment, a nuclear attack would be decisive. Modern war is different from traditional war, and one cannot allow the enemy an opportunity for a first strike. As Peng told Khrushchev of this split in strategic thinking between the two sides, Khrushchev announced that they could discuss this topic at a later date. Soviet military leaders were not only inclined towards a hard line strategic position vis-is the west, but also revealed a chauvinistic arrogance during their cooperation with China.
In September 1955, the Soviet Ministry of Defense again suggested signing an air defense coordination agreement between the outer Baikal military district and the Shenyang military district. Shengyang military district air force commander Zhou Chiping was assigned to negotiate with the Soviets. Before leaving, General Chief of Staff Su Yu, and air force commander Liu Yalou, told Zhou that these negotiations were limited to air defense intelligence cooperation only. However, when Zhou arrived at Chita on September 23, the Soviets wanted him to sign a previously prepared agreement, which included provisions giving Soviet airplanes the right to enter Chinese airspace and land in Chinese airports without giving advance notice to the Chinese. However, Chinese airplanes flying in Chinese airspace, or entering Soviet airspace must inform the Soviets in advance. In addition, the Beijing military district should report all enemy aircraft intelligence to the Soviets. The agreement further called for China to construct additional airports in Manchuria to satisfy the landing needs of Soviet airplanes. Moreover, conditions regarding the offering of fuel, accommodation and food to the other side were all unequal. Because these provisions exceeded the limits of his authority, Zhou Chiping quickly sent a telegram to China, requesting further instruction. Liu Yalou replied, saying the agreement was unacceptable, and that talks must be limited to the topic of air defense intelligence cooperation only. However, the reply Zhou received agreed with the terms, and on September 27, he signed it. When Zhou Chiping returned to China and reported the news, Liu was shocked. Peng was extremely angry, and reported the situation to Zhou Enlai. Since telegrams sent between the Chinese delegation and Beijing were transferred by the Soviet communications system, it was highly possible that the Soviets were behind the deception. Zhou Enlai ordered that before the truth was uncovered, China would ignore Soviet consultants' opinion that the agreement should go into effect in December. On December 29, the Central Military Committee (CMC) held a regular working meeting in which they agreed that China had no need to invest in additional airports, and decided to tell the Soviet Chief Consultant and Ministry of Defense the following: Zhou Chiping violated the instructions of the General Staff and the Air Force Command when he signed the air defense agreement between the two countries. This was an unorganized, undisciplined action, which should be punished, and the agreement could not be executed. The results of the investigation were never known. However, one thing is certain: the proposed Soviet agreement was not equal. That undoubtedly was the major problem that impeded the implementation of a Sino-Soviet air defense military cooperation agreement.
This type of unequal treatment was common. For example, in the 1950s, Soviet specialists helped China develop its military surveying and mapping operations. Based on these operations, China drew military maps on a scale of 1:50,000 [km]. The Soviet side requested a copy of every new map, but was not willing to provide the Chinese side with Soviet drawn maps of the Sino-Soviet border, only revised maps captured from the Japanese. The Chinese military mapping bureau naturally declined the Soviet's request. Another example occurred in May 1955, when the Soviet army withdrew from Lushun and Dalian. The Soviets transferred the naval equipment and bases, but held out in returning mapping materials and navigational maps of the adjacent areas. After negotiating, the Soviet side provided a copy of "Survey Measurements and Coordinate Data for the Lushan-Dalian Region."
In spite of these events, Sino-Soviet relations were still in a "honeymoon" period. The greater trend towards mutual assistance and support was not affected by these incidences. On January 28 1956, at the first political consultative conference of the Warsaw Pact countries, Nie Rongzhen, acting as an official observer, pointed out that "peace in Europe and Asia is inseparable. Six hundred million Chinese people will unite with the Soviet Union and all the people of the people's democratic countries forever." China continued its full-scale cooperation with the Soviet Union on political and diplomatic aspects, which was evident in helping the Soviets resolve its conflict with Poland, the Hungry incident, and at the Moscow Communist Party Conference. Similarly, the Soviet Union continued its increased economic and military aid to China, particularly on October 15 1957 at the signing of the National Defense New Technology Agreement, which promised to assist China in developing nuclear industry and weaponry.
The November 1957 Moscow Communist Party Conference demonstrated the strength and unprecedented unity of the socialist camp, as Sino-Soviet relations reached its apex. However, not long after the conference, serious differences began to emerge between Chinese and Soviet leaders regarding military cooperation. These events are usually referred to as the "long-wave radio station" and "the combined fleet" incidences. It is commonly believed that this first direct conflict between the two sides was the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. The cause of the conflict, according to Chinese leaders headed by Mao, was that Soviet behavior violated Chinese sovereignty; that Khrushchev intended to control China. For a long time, this view prevailed in Chinese society and in historical studies, and seems to be the historical consensus.
In recent years however, newly declassified Russian documents and the publication of Soviet party memoirs relating to these two incidences have surfaced, allowing people to investigate the course of these historical events more thoroughly. Making a serious comparison of material from both sides, and considering the international background of the time, it appears that things were not as simple as previously imagined.
The Favorable Conditions and Background for Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation
After the Moscow conference, Sino-Soviet friendship entered into a period of unprecedented prosperity. After the Chinese political delegation returned home, the military delegation continued its visit. On November 27, Khrushchev said a few words at the farewell party for Peng, sincerely thanking the CCP for their understanding and support of the Soviet Union, and highly praising the unity and friendship of the two parties and nations. The Chinese were moved very much by that demonstration. High level officials in Moscow talked of merging the Warsaw Pact and Sino-Soviet alliance treaties, while there was information that Chinese and Soviet troops were implementing joint defense in border regions. These rumors were not unjustified. The results of the Moscow Conference were to both enlarge and deepen the economic and military union within the socialist camp.
According to Russian documents, on December 14 China submitted a memo to the Soviet Union. In this memo, "the Chinese government suggests the establishment of a joint Sino-Soviet Committee to manage the defense industry, composed of several members from both sides, meeting one or two times per year." The major responsibilities of the joint committee, envisioned by the Chinese proposal, were "1. Exchange published or unpublished books, periodicals, manuals, directories (telephone directories), technological standards, and any other information that both sides deem suitable. 2. Discuss standardization, technological conditions, specifications, national standards, and other issues related to weapons production acceptable to both sides. 3. Discuss the standardization of technological specifications, and provide both sides with standard products and measuring tools. 4. Discuss invitations and liaison possibilities with specialists, and the step, time period, and scope of assistance. 5. Invite or dispatch professionals and delegations on the basis of mutual benefit, in order to proceed with on-site investigations, participate in discussions, report research results, and short term field work. 6. Establish constant contact between the defense industry's research and production fields on both sides. 7. Discuss the exchange and supply of teaching guides, science textbooks or other materials related to the development of the defense industry, or materials required for the advancement of the defense industry's technological skills. 8. Exchange experiences and lessons regarding the adoption of new machinery, equipment, and technology, and applying research results to weapon production. 9. Research the problem of safe guarding technological information for weapons production. 10. Discuss national defense issues that both sides believe necessary." As is clear from the contents, the proposal put forth by China seemed concerned primarily with obtaining Soviet assistance. However, the establishment of this pattern of cooperation no doubt embodies these concepts of increased military cooperation. In the Following months, both sides kept in close contact: exchanging information and coordinating diplomatic, economic, and political policies.
On January 27 1958, Soviet Ambassador Iudin told Zhou that the Soviet government proposed establishing a nuclear free zone in Asia,and requested China's opinion. Zhou said that it was a good idea and he would reply after consulting with the Central Committee and the Chinese government. On February 1, Zhou met with Soviet Attaché Krutikov (Iudin had fallen ill,) and told him that the Chinese government completely supported the Soviet proposal, which would be very beneficial to reducing tension in the international situation and opposing the dangers of nuclear war. Zhou also agreed with the Soviet opinion that China should persuade India to raise this proposal. On the same day, Zhou met with the Indian charge d'affaires, explaining China's position.
On March 31, Khrushchev declared that the Soviet government had decided to unilaterally stop nuclear testing. On April 4, the Soviet government submitted a memorandum to the US and British governments, emphasizing the Soviets unilateral nuclear test ban and requesting that a quick agreement be reached. That same day, Khrushchev sent a message to Zhou, informing him of the situation and appealing to the People's Republic of China (PRC) for support. On April 7, the People's Daily published both the Soviet proposal and a positive editorial supporting it. On April 9, Zhou spoke at a diplomatic ceremony, saying that the Soviet government's "great peace proposal will benefit all human beings, and deserves our welcome and support." On April 13, Zhou, acting as an official representative for the Chinese government, formally replied to Khrushchev, supporting the Soviet proposal.
Meanwhile, China also informed the Soviet Union of its foreign policy adjustment toward Japan. On May 9, First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Zhang Wentian met with the Soviet attach Antonov, informing him that China would press the Japanese government to increase the strength of the socialist and communist parties in the Japanese congress. Zhang asked Antonov to relay this message to the Soviet government so as to "let Moscow know of the steps we are preparing to take and what are our goals are."
While closely cooperating in the diplomatic area, Sino-Soviet economic cooperation was not only limited to mutual assistance and support, but began to play an enlarged role.
On February 1958, Khrushchev summoned Chinese Ambassador Liu Xiao, and proposed setting up a "Ruble Region" within the socialist camp. Before the Soviets had even formally informed the Chinese Embassy of the contents of these discussions, Chinese leaders had already expressed a positive response. On February 28, while talking to Iudin, Mao emphasized that "the CCP CC fully supports the Soviet Union's correct and fruitful policies" and "these policies demonstrate great thoughtfulness and flexibility." At the end of their conversation, Mao said the CCP CC was very pleased to see the briefing of Khrushchev and Liu's talk, which was "a very good talk. We agree on all the issues put forward in the conversation." On March 9 during his talk with Iudin, Zhu De pointed out that "Khrushchev's idea regarding the establishment of a 'Ruble Region' pleases us. It is a counter to the 'Dollar Region.'" Zhu also said, "the Moscow Conference greatly increased the power of the socialist camp, consolidating the unity of the socialist countries. From that point on, opportunities for increasing the economic unification of the socialist countries has gradually developed." In regard to economic cooperation, "like all other things, the initiative should be taken by our leader- the Soviet Union."
From May 20-23, the COMECON meeting was held in Moscow. The meeting discussed developing economic cooperation through the socialist international division of labor and coordinating production specialization. A proposal was passed unanimously. A Chinese delegation was invited to the meeting, and an editorial in the People's Daily praised it, saying that its tremendous accomplishments would doubtlessly "further enhance the brotherly mutual support and cooperation among socialist countries." The editorial also claimed that the Chinese government "always believed that continually reinforcing the unity among socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union is our highest international obligation."
Sino-Soviet cooperation had become closer politically. Because of Yugoslavia's performance during the Hungary incident, particularly Tito's failure to join the communist party conference in Moscow, Khrushchev was very angry. As a result, the Soviets decided not to dispatch adelegation to attend the 7th Yugoslav Communist Coalition Congress. The CPSU also wanted to criticize Yugoslavia's guiding principals. Khrushchev first sought Mao's opinion. On April 5, Mao met Iudin at Wuhan, and endorsed the Soviet conclusion regarding the Yugoslavia Communist Party's problem, especially the Soviet refusal to attend the congress. Mao said that the question of how to treat the draft of the Yugoslavia Communist Party guideline is very important, and that the CCP CC would hold a meeting between April 5-6 to discuss the question in detail.
Mao pledged that the CCP CC Politburo would surely support the Soviet position. Zhou immediately called Liu Shaoqi to consult with him, and they decided that because time was short, the party meeting should be postponed for one day.
Mao said to Iudin that although the meeting had not yet been held, the urgency of the issue made it necessary for the Politburo to report their decision to Moscow that "the Politburo had discussed the issue and supported the Soviet position." Mao stressed that it was very important to display CCP-CPSU unity on this type of issue. At the end of the conversation, Mao asked Iudin to congratulate Krushchev for him on his appointment to the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, saying "this was completely the correct step to strengthen unification; an important step to protect the absolute unity of leadership, and thus completely understandable and reasonable." On April 18 in his conversation with Soviet counselor Krutitov, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs for China Zeng Yongquan criticized the Yugoslavia Communist Party's guideline as "out and out revisionist." Vice Minister of CCP Central International Liasion Department Liu Ningyi declared that Yugoslavia was provoking all socialist countries and brother parties, and should be countered with determination. A May 6 article entitled Modern Revisionism should be Censured was published in the People's Daily. Apparently, Soviet and Chinese leaders were cooperating to defend and solidify the unity of the socialist camp.
It was in this atmosphere, a background characterized by friendly Sino-Soviet cooperation and unification, that the issues of the long range radio station and combined fleet were raised. In Khrushchev's opinion, it was very natural to raise these issues. By the end of 1957, one problem the Chinese Navy faced by was how to develop new technology and equipment, while the Soviets tried to make better use of their Pacific Fleet. The needs of both sides drove them to try to promote military cooperation, but beyond Khrushchev's expectations, his suggested means of cooperation was subject to Mao's determined resistance and furious condemnation.
Khrushchev's wishful thinking and Mao's overreaction
In December 1958, the first Soviet nuclear-powered submarine embarked upon its maiden voyage, realizing the Soviet dream of having a submarine fleet with blue water capabilities. However, the Soviets now faced a new problem; communication between the submarine fleet at sea and the mainland. The Soviet navy had repeated discussions about the problem, and two plans were submitted to the National Defense Committee. The first plan called for the construction of a long-wave radio station on Soviet territory, but that was vetoed due to the enormous costs involved,and there was no guaranteed that a Soviet radio station would guarantee stable communications. The second plan was to set up long-wave radio stations both on China's Hainan Island and in India, each assuming responsibilities for communicating with the Soviet submarine fleets in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean respectively. Khrushchev rejected the Indian Plan out of hand, as he was afraid Nehru's might be averse to the plan, thus damaging new established Indo-Soviet relations. Regarding the Hainan Island Plan, Khrushchev not only believed it was possible, but would not be difficult because the PRC was a socialist country that shared common interests with the USSR. Above all, its navy was being developed with Soviet aid. Therefore, on January 6 1958, the Soviet Ministry of National Defense Admiral Platonov, gave a letter and draft agreement to the Chinese Commander of the Navy Xiao Jinguang, inquiring about the possibility of the two countries jointly constructing and using a long-wave radio station.
Meanwhile, the PRC had similar needs. As early as 1954 when the first Chinese submarine force was established, the PRC had begun preparations to set up a long-wave radio station. With Soviet help, imported equipment for long-wave radio stations were installed respectively in Qingdao, Ningbo, and Zhanjiang in 1957. Yet all of them were of low or medium strength. With the development of the Chinese submarine force, and increasing blue water training missions, it became more urgent to establish a high-powered long-wave radio station. Since it was difficult for the PRC to undertake such a project alone, the Chinese navy started to develop contacts and consult with the USSR in an effort to obtain Soviet aid. 
Both the USSR and PRC desired to set up the long-wave radio station, yet how to go about it remained an issue. On April 18, in his letter to Peng, the Soviet Minister of National Defense suggested establishing a 1000 kilowatts long-wave transmitter, and a long-range receiver in South China. He said the total expense would be 110 million rubles, of which 70 million rubles would be paid by the Soviet Union and 40 million by the PRC. After construction, the two installations would be jointly used by the USSR and the PRC. On April 24, Mao instructed the concerned department to reply as follows: the PRC agreed to set up the installations on Chinese territory, but the PRC alone would be responsible for all expenses, and would be the sole owner of the installations. In accordance with Mao's proposal, Peng insisted at the 152nd congress of the CCP CMC on May 10, that the long-wave station should be built solely with Chinese funds instead of joint Sino-Soviet funds. Peng also said that the station could offer intelligence to the USSR in peacetime and the USSR could send representatives to the station during times of war. However, under no circumstances would the USSR be allowed to establish military bases on Chinese territory. On May 23 the CMC met again to ensure the PRC would not jointly establish a long-wave radio station with the USSR. On June 4, Peng informed theSoviet general adviser in China of China's decision.
On June 5, Peng sent the minutes of the discussions to Mao reporting: the USSR still persisted in their initial idea of jointly establishing the station, and they propose to dispatch their specialists to China in early June to select appropriate sites, conduct investigations and designs for the station, and draft an agreement. In order to allow the investigation and design phases of the project to proceed, Peng suggested allowing Soviet specialists to come to China to conduct technical work, solving the questions of investment and ownership later. On June 7, Mao commented on the minutes of the conversation, instructing that "it could proceed according to your suggestion. However, the money for the project must be provided by the PRC rather than the Soviet Union." If the Soviets apply pressure, "don't reply, just stall for time, or reply after the Central Committee has discussed the problem. The two governments should sign an agreement on the issue." Mao emphasized the importance of this issue by adding phrases to Peng's notes such as: "This is the PRC's opinion, not my personal opinion." By this time, Mao had become a little annoyed with the Soviet's persistence.
On June 12, Peng officially answered Malinovskii, reaffirming the position of the PRC government, and suggesting that the two countries sign an agreement on the issue. On June 28, the assistant Minister of the Department of Naval Communication Forces, Letvenskii, lead a group of six Soviet specialists to China, bringing with them a draft agreement. The USSR still insisted on jointly constructing the long-wave radio station and sharing the costs with the PRC. Discussions between the Soviet and Chinese leaders went in circles without reaching an agreement. On July21, in accordance with the spirit of the CMC's discussions, Peng wrote another letter to Malinovskii, reaffirming the PRC's principle of establishing the long-wave station on its own: We welcome the Soviet specialist's offer of aid and advice on the technological aspects of the project. Regarding the funds needed for the project however, the PRC alone would assume responsibility.
On the same day, the Soviets put forth an idea about a "combined fleet." The Soviet proposal was based on the PRC's request for Soviet naval aid.At the same time however, it might have been an alternative way for the Soviets to solve their naval communication problems.
Following the National Defense New Technology Agreement, Chinese ground and air forces were well positioned to develop new weaponry. It was natural for the Chinese navy not to want to be left behind. During a Conference in Moscow, Xiao Jinguang, acting as a member of theChinese Military Goodwill Mission, asked Gorshkov, the Soviet Commander of Navy, to aid the PRC in constructing nuclear-powered submarines and submarines armed with guided missiles. The Soviets implied that it was not necessary for the PRC to develop such submarines, that the USSR had not yet successfully developed them, and when the USSR did possess them, they would offer them to China. After returning to Beijing, Chinese naval leaders carefully researched and submitted a report to Peng and the CMC in April 1958. The report said that, it was very important to obtain new technology for the sake of Chinese naval development. The USSR had improved on the power and structure of some vessels, and had succeeded in developing several kinds of guided missiles for submarines and torpedo boats. The Chinese navy, however, still made vessels according to five design drawings given to China by the USSR during the first five-year plan. Therefore, the Chinese navy was sorely in need of new design drawings and other information for constructing new vessels. The Navy suggested that the PRC government request Soviet aid. Thus, with the support of Peng and the other leaders of the CMC, Zhou sent a letter to Khrushchev on June 28. He expressed the desire of the PRC that the Soviet government offer the Chinese navy new technological assistance, namely designing drawings and materials for the construction of new models of fighting vessels- in a step by step program when conditions allow. On the same day, Zhou ratified Nie Rongzhen's plan to research and develop nuclear-powered submarines. Nie reported: regarding the designing and trial production of nuclear powered submarines, Comrade Liu Jie, who is serving in the second department, had discussed it with a Soviet specialist in the department, and the specialist expressed his personal support for the plan.
On July 21, Iudin requested to meet with Mao immediately saying he had something very urgent to report. At 10 o'clock that night, Mao met with Iudin by the swimming pool in Zhong Nan Hai. Iudin explained that he had just returned to Beijing from a Conference of the Politburo of the CPSU CC and was asked to report to Mao about the Conference. Their conversation lasted three and a half hours, focusing mainly on the issue of the navy. Iudin said that Khrushchev hoped the Chinese comrades would understand that due to geographical limitations, the USSR could not utilize its nuclear-powered submarine forces to their fullest extent. The Chinese coastline however, was very long and had good geographical conditions. Since the United States was the common enemy of the PRC and the USSR if future wars broke out, Khrushchev wished to discuss the possibility of establishing a combined fleet with the Chinese comrades, possibly including Vietnam as well. He hoped the CCP CC would dispatch Zhou and Peng to Moscow to discuss the issue in detail. Mao pointed out immediately that though the PRC asked for Soviet aid, they had never considered the possibility of a "combined" fleet. After Iudin finished his report, Mao seized on the issue of acombined fleet, asking again and again: was "cooperation" the prerequisite for Soviet aid? Would the Soviets otherwise refuse to help the Chinese? Iudin explained repeatedly that it only was a suggestion, and they wanted to invite the Chinese comrades to discuss it with them. But Mao stressed that first, the guiding principle must be decided upon: was this Sino-Soviet joint cooperation, or unilateral Soviet assistance to China? If the USSR was reluctant to offer aid, the PRC could abandon the plan for developing nuclear submarines.
Iudin and the other personnel returned to their embassy and discussed the situation overnight, finally concluding that Mao opposed the establishment of aSino-Soviet combined fleet. Iudin drafted a report to the CPSU CC at once and delivered it in the early morning.
At 11 o'clock the next morning, Mao summoned Iudin and the other personnel to Zhong Nan Hai for more discussions. Participating in this conversation on the Chinese side were all the members of the CCP CC Politburo currently in Beijing, and Mao seemed to stress that his statements represented the opinions of all Chinese leaders. The major points of this conversation have been officially published in China. According to those publications, Mao restated the PRC's rejection of a combined fleet, and declared that China was withdrawing its request for Soviet aid. Mao's words were sharper than the previous day: "The Soviet comrades achieved victory forty years ago, and have much experience. We achieved victory only eight years ago and have no experience. You unilaterally proposed the issue of 'joint cooperation.' You do not trust the Chinese at all, only the Russians. Russians are superior while the Chinese are inferior; careless. So you want joint cooperation? Since you want joint cooperation, let's discuss everything; army, navy, air force, industry, agriculture, culture, education. Is this okay? Maybe we should give you the entire Chinese coastline of over 10 thousand kilometers, while we only keep a guerrilla army. You possess only a little nuclear power, yet you want to control, to lease." Mao was venting his long pent-up grievances toward Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, by criticizing the USSR on some extraneous pretext.
Soviet counselor Vereshchagin's memoirs supplemented the abridged literature published in China, which was concerned primarily with Mao's rebukes of the USSR. For example, during Mao's first visit to Moscow, Stalin ordered listening devices installed in the Chinese embassy. Former Soviet Ambassador Roshchin recruited intelligence workers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China. Beriia colluded with Gao Gang, sending people to contact Gao many times. The USSR collected intelligence illegally through their consulate in Xinjiang, etc. In addition, Peng interjected that when signing the Sino-Soviet Far East Air Defense Agreement, the USSR exploited the Chinese delegates' ignorance of Russian to cheat them out of a signature. Although Mao repeatedly stated that the entire phenomenon was a question of "one finger to nine fingers," meaning that the PRC and Soviet Union were in agreement on almost all issues, what impressed the Soviets was "Mao's torrential outpouring of condemnation in a steady flow for the entire day." "All the questions were actually related to Sino-Soviet national and party relations." The Soviets were "greatly depressed" and realized that "they had absolutely no understanding of Chinese policy; they had overestimated the importance of ideology and underestimated the difference between the two country's national interests."
Understanding the seriousness of the question, Khrushchev explained several times in his talk that during the Congress of the Presidium of CPSU CC no rights issues; proprietary rights, leasing rights or rights of command were ever mentioned, and the USSR had no wish to establish military bases in China. They only intended to raise the question and research an appropriate course of action with their Chinese comrades. Iudin initially suggested that Khrushchev visit Beijing himself to discuss the issue directly with Mao. Although Mao stressed that his talk should be transmitted to Khrushchev in its entirety, when compiling the memorandum of their conversation, Iudin still omitted Mao's words that "if the submarine problem could not be solved, their meeting need not be held." Iudin's explanation for this was simple: why should I make conflict between Khrushchev and Mao?" However, just as Iudin expected, Mao's words both astonished Moscow, and made Soviet leaders uneasy. When calling Iudin, Khrushchev said uneasily that this was baffling, and asked what happened to Mao. Khrushchev believed it was necessary for him to resolve this with Mao face to face, but because he had scheduled a visit to the United States to resolve the current Middle East crisis, he was unable to meet with Mao immediately.
Apparently, due to instructions receive from Moscow, Iudin asked to meet again with Chinese leaders. On July 27, Liu, Zhou, and Deng summoned Iudin. Iudin reported to them that Khrushchev thought it strange that Chinese comrades believed the USSR seemed to have political preconditions for helping the PRC develop its navy. Liu asked if the condition for Soviet naval assistance to establish a fleet was that this fleet would be jointly owned by the PRC and the USSR. Iudin explicitly answered: the Soviet Union neither posed any political preconditions, nor ever gave any indication that there were any. Answering Zhou's inquiries about the long-wave radio station, Iudin still said that the USSR posed no political preconditions regarding that issue either. Finally, Iudin informed the Chinese leaders that Khrushchev would not soon be able to visit Beijing. The storm seemed to have passed.
Khrushchev however, was still not at ease. After he was sure that the Iraq problem was not raised at the London Conference of Baghdad Pact Countries, he called off his scheduled visit to the United States, and immediately left for a secret visit to Beijing.
The Superficial results of the CCP-CPSU talks and its hidden shadow
The communiqué published after Mao and Khrushchev's talks declared: "The two sides talked in an extremely sincere and friendly atmosphere. We fully discussed the urgent and significant issues in the current international situation, the issue of advancing and strengthening the friendship, alliance, and mutual aid in Sino-Soviet relations, and jointly striving to peacefully resolve international problems and defend world peace. A consensus was reached on all issues."These words however, did not erase the hidden shadow in the hearts of both leaders regarding the incident.
From 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on July 31, Mao and Khrushchev held a meeting in Huairen Hall in Zhong Nanhai. During their conversation, Khrushchev first made a long, drawn outexplanation for the initial Soviet proposal concerning the submarine fleet. Khrushchev firmly denied that the USSR used words such as "combined fleet" or "joint fleet." He believed it was Iudin who misconstrued the Soviet meaning, and the whole thing was "a misunderstanding." He stated categorically that when he discussed the issue with the Presidium of the CPSU CC, "they never considered the idea of jointly commanding or jointly possessing the Chinese fleet with the PRC as was their Chinese comrades' impression." Khrushchev also said with a tone of being wronged, that "we never thought Comrade Mao would equate the matter to a violation of sovereignty, and we feel hurt for having been regarded in this way." Thus, after finishing his complaints, Mao initially ended discussions regarding the "joint cooperation" question. Both sides agreed henceforth that they "would never mention these types of questions." Khrushchev then began to discuss the issue of the long-wave radio station. He pleaded that this issue was not discussed in the Central Committee, but raised by the military. The Soviet intention was to build a long-wave radio station in South China to direct the Soviet Pacific Fleet when necessary. It would be best if the PRC allows the USSR to loan it money for the project's construction. The ownership rights would belong to PRC. The USSR only wanted an agreement guaranteeing access to the station. At the same time, the PRC could use Soviet stations in Vladivostok, the Thousand Islands, and the North Sea. However, if the PRC refused, the USSR was ready to withdraw its suggestion. Mao stressed that Malinovskii's words about the Soviet's wish to invest in the project meant to the PCR that the USSR wanted to share in the ownership of the station. Mao agreed to establish the long-wave radio station, but insisted that the PRC be responsible for all the money needed, and be in solepossession of the station, though the Soviets would be able to use it. Khrushchev again expressed that the ownership would surely belong to PRC, but since the USSR would use it, it was reasonable to share in the expense of the project, perhaps in the form of loans. Mao obstinately refused Soviet loans, and even threatened to give up the project if the USSR insisted. Their talks about the issue ended.
Although the atmosphere of their talks was tense and sensitive, and Mao was also impolite to Khrushchev, he was not as sharp and rude as he had been to Iudin. After all, Khrushchev was coming to offer an explanation and admit "mistakes." Moreover, Khrushchev exonerated himself by implying that Iudin was responsible for all mistakes, which certainly had nothing to do with Iudin's sudden stroke, and absence from their talks. Khrushchev evidently felt that the issues of the long-wave radio station and combined fleet had caused such fierce and serious responses among the Chinese leaders, that they may influence the entire Sino-Soviet relationship. He therefore had no other choice but to find a scapegoat, and in early 1959, Iudin was relieved of his post in Beijing and returned to his country. From the evidence discussed above, it seems Iudin actually did not misconstrue Khrushchev's intent. At most, his mistake lay in not completely changing his words after discovering Mao's opposition to the idea, but to trying to clumsily explain, which only angered Mao.
According to currently published archival documents, and the recollections of those involved, the long-wave radio station and combined fleet both were raised after soviet leaders' researched the issues. Their main intent was to obtain a port for Soviet naval vessels along the Chinese coast. However, they only considered the United States, and had no intention of controlling the PRC. As Gorshkov explained to Khrushchev, the Soviet navy insisted on establishing a long-wave radio station on Hainan island because the US navy had founded bases in the Hawaii archipelago, on Midway Island, and most importantly in the Philippines and Taiwan. In emergencies, the Soviet Pacific Fleet could be docked and repaired at Chinese ports, thus saving time and improving the fleet's fighting capabilities. Kulik, who had a long tenure as head of the CPR office of the International Department of the CPSU CC, recalled that at the time, the USSR had no guided missiles with which it could reach the American west coast from Soviet territory. Therefore, the Soviet navy wanted to establish a submarine fleet capable of carrying out missile attacks on the United States. This required a Chinese port to berth the Soviet fleet, and a long-wave radio station for communications. Soviet scholars even believed that if the combined fleet was established at that time and Soviet nuclear-powered submarines were able to patrol the South Pacific, the Cuban Missile Crisis might never have occurred.
Though Soviet leaders had no intention of violating Chinese Sovereignty, or controlling the PRC through establishing the long-wave radio station or combined fleet, the USSR was only concerned with the United States, and did not consider the Chinese impressions of the situation. Khrushchev's thoughts were: this proposal was in the common interests of the socialist camp; the PRC and USSR were both socialist countries and had signed an alliance treaty. Moreover, the long-wave radio station and the fleet-repairing base were needed by the PRC as well, and in exchange the Chinese fleet would have access to Soviet bases. "Regardless of whether it was our fleet, the Chinese fleet, or the fleet of another socialist country, they all served one purpose; allow us to be prepared to counterattack when the capitalist countries waged war on us." "Therefore, regarding this proposal, a friendly, newly established socialist China should be happy to offer assistance, and should not have any difficulties." Even after receiving the telegram from Iudin, Khrushchev still believed "all questions would be easily resolved, provided he could discuss the issues with the Chinese comrades face to face" It was only long after the incident that Khrushchev admitted the Soviet proposal "touched a nerve in this country, having long been under foreign rule," and was "sensitive about Chinese Sovereignty," and had injured Mao and his nationalist sentiments. Khrushchev had said to his son: "We were a bit rash, and exaggerated the significance of the unification of all communist parties and socialist countries." He wrote regretfully in his memoirs: "if we had known what their reaction would be in advance, we would never have raised the proposal."
From the evidence above, we can conclude that Soviet leaders had no evil intent, but the way they raised the proposal was too direct and disrespectful, and did not take into account Chinese nationalism. From this perspective it was Mao who overreacted. Although it is understandable from the nationalist perspective that Mao, living in a country having experienced so much invasion and humiliation, felt hurt at the Soviet suggestion. As an ally of the Soviet Union and supreme leader of his country though, there seems to be other reasons for his infuriation and sharp response. Mao's overreaction, though somewhat related to his personality, seems to be more connected with his fear of the changing developments in Sino-Soviet relations at the time and Mao's changing psychology.
Mao had been dissatisfied with Stalin's chauvinism and the unequal status of the PRC and the USSR for a long time, though he never showed it. The CCP's status had very much improved since the Korean War however, and after Stalin's death, Mao's revolutionary experience was second to none in the socialist camp, especially after the 20th congress of CPSU and the Poland and Hungary affairs, in which Soviet prestige was struck a blow and it was with Mao's help to some extent that Khrushchev weathered the crisis. The time when the CPSU could arbitrarily direct others had passed, or at least the CCP had become its equal. Mao's first visit to the Soviet Union and the situation which existed in 1957 were completely different. Under these circumstances, how could Mao tolerate Khrushchev acting as Stalin did? Although Mao repeatedly stated that "the USSR was the leader of the socialist camp," in reality, "the leader" needed to consult with the CCP on all issues.
For Moscow, there were no indications of this coming storm. Mao however knew of it. The storm caused by Iudin's report was his to control at all times. During contact with Moscow, Mao carefully controlled the sense of propriety. On one hand he wanted to teach Khrushchev a lesson, letting him know that the USSR had wronged China in the past. On the other hand, he wanted to stress that mainstream Sino-Soviet relations was based on friendship and cooperation, with the goal of obtaining Soviet aid for the Chinese navy. Therefore in Mao's talk to Iudin, the man whom he criticized most by name was Stalin, then Beriia, Molotov, Mikoian, Roshchin etc; yet he did not criticize Khrushchev. Instead, at some points he even expressed his appreciation and gratefulness toward Khrushchev. Mao's Strategy was successful.
The first problem resolved was the long-wave radio station. On August 3 Peng and Malinovskii, each representing their respective governments, signed an agreement in Beijing. The main contents of the agreement are as follows: 1) The long-wave radio station would be built solely by China, with ownership of the station belonging to the PRC. 2) The USSR would aid and direct the PRC in the technological aspects of planning and construction. The equipment and materials unavailable in the PRC could be ordered from the USSR. The costs of designing materials, equipment, specialists and all other things the USSR provided according to the agreement would be paid by the PRC through a trading account. 3) The issue of Soviet access to the long-wave radio station should be negotiated separately. In November of the same year, the two sides signed the contract concerning the shipping of Soviet equipment and specialists to China. On September 13 1959, the head of the Soviet long-wave radio station, Lieutenant Ilin, led a group of eight specialties to China, to establish the project designing office together with Chinese technical personnel, and began designing the large, high-powered, long-wave radio station. In February 1960, the CCP CMC ratified the design and work on the project began.
The second issue resolved was the air defense agreement. On July 31 Peng stated that the original air defense agreement drafted by the USSR was unequal, and was so detrimental to the friendship of the two countries that the Chinese delegation did not sign it. Malinovskii said that the agreement could be reexamined. Both sides agreed to hold a meeting on November 20 in Shenyang. From November 25 to December 7, Soviet Commander of the Far East Military District Penkovskii, Commander of the outer Baikal military district Kreizer, and Chinese Commander of the Shenyang military district Deng Hua, negotiated and signed theMutual Air Defense Intelligence Exchange and Coordinated Operation Plan.
The last problem resolved concerned new Soviet naval technological assistance to China. After returning to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev quickly telegraphed Zhou on September 8, agreeing to offer technological assistance to the Chinese navy and suggested that the PRC dispatch a delegation to negotiate. After negotiations, Su Zhenhua and Arkhipov on behalf of their respective governments, signed The Agreement on Soviet Governmental Assistance in New Technology to China. According to the agreement, the USSR agreed to sell China 629 submarine missiles, 633 submarine torpedoes, 205 speed boat missiles, 183 speed boat missiles, 184 hydrofoil speed boat torpedoes, [4?] Р-11ФМballistic missiles,  П-15 cruise missiles, design drawings for fifty-one types of equipment such as power-devices, radar, sonar, radio, guided navigation equipment, etc, and models of various machines used in the production of naval vessels and guided missiles. The USSR also transferred to China the rights to reproduce all the above-mentioned items. Soon sixty Soviet specialists arrived in China to help the Chinese with the work of developing their designs and imitating the Soviets. Most technical materials and some equipment were delivered to China as well. The implementation of this agreement allowed Chinese naval vessels to evolve from a conventional to a modern force, complete with both modern power sources and guided missile technology.
The conflict had finally passed; the PRC obtained the desired aid, and Khrushchev believed that all issues had been resolved and was very satisfied with the results of his visit. However, instead of taking a turn for the better, Sino-soviet relations became increasingly tense. The way in which Mao handled the incident undoubtedly made Khrushchev feel foolish, as he accepted Mao's diatribe and was unable to express his discomfort. Although the political unity between the PRC and the USSR was ensured, the shadow in Khrushchev's heart, projected by Mao's words and behavior, was difficult to remove. With this lack of trust, any unexpected action by either side might provoke the other side, causing a further deterioration in relations. Sino-soviet relations further deteriorated with the following incidences: First, the PRC bombed Jinmen without notifying the USSR in advance, and postponed their offer of the US Sidewinder missile that fell on Chinese territory, which Khrushchev strongly resented. Subsequently the USSR, in violation of the National Defense New Technology Agreement, suspended their offer of weapon models to the PRC, a move highly criticized by Chinese leaders. Chinese military actions on the Sino-Indian border, with no prior consultation with Moscow angered Khrushchev. In return, the completely neutral position of the Soviet Union regarding the conflict irritated Beijing. Finally, the direct conflict between Chinese and Soviet leaders in Beijing in October 1959 and in Bucharest in June 1960 caused an open split between the PRC and the USSR. Eventually, Khrushchev's unilateral and hasty decision to abrogate the contract with the PRC and withdraw all Soviet specialists from China, not only meant the end of Sino-Soviet military cooperation, but also reduced the Sino-Soviet Alliance treaty to a useless piece of paper.
This article does not intend to discover who was responsible for the failures in Sino-Soviet military cooperation. The results of the research however, certainly will inspire people to better understand the characteristic of the internal relations of the socialist camp. Many Chinese papers on Sino-Soviet relations often state that the Soviets violated Chinese territorial sovereignty. In most cases however, the USSR's behavior originated from its chauvinistic attitudes and feelings of national superiority. Chauvinism and the violation of a nation's sovereignty are two absolutely different issues, and should not be confused. A nation state with great power, a long history, or celebrated international prestige, is inclined to express its superiority in words and behavior. This phenomenon was especially prevalent in the internal relations of socialist countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Attempting to emphasize the uniformity of ideology, socialist countries referred to each other in fraternal overtones, speaking and interacting with each other informally, diluting the formal relations between them. As a result, the relatively strong power often inadvertently demonstrates some chauvinistic tendencies. When the relations between the two sides were good, the relatively weaker power could tolerate the other side's chauvinism for political gain and long-term interests. When relations are strained however, the resentment of the relatively weaker power surfaced, in the form of criticism of the stronger power for violating its sovereignty. Such cases are prevalent not only in Sino-Soviet relations, but also in Sino-Korean and Sino-Vietnamese relations. The evidence suggests that an important reason for the failure of Sino-Soviet military cooperation, and the subsequent deterioration of relations, is both strong power chauvinism, and the highly emotional response of the weaker power.
(Translated by Zhao Hai, Song Min, and Jeffrey Becker)
SHEN ZHIHUA is professor of history at Peking University in Beijing. He is the deputy head of its Modern History Research Center and Archives, affiliated with the PHP.
 For details see, Shen Zhihua, "Zhongsu Jiemeng yu Sulian dui Xinjiang Zhengce de Bianhua (1944-1950)," in Jindaishi Yanjiu, issue 3, 1999 ("The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Change of Soviet Policy toward Xinjiang," in Modern Historical Studies). See also, "Kangmei Yuanchao Zhanzheng zhong de Sulian Kong Jun," in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, issue 2, 2000 ("The Soviet air force in the Korean War," in CCP Historical Studies).
 Wang Yan ed., Peng Dehuai Nianpu, (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, p. 586.) (The Chronology of Peng Dehuai, Beijing: The People's Press.) Zheng Wenhan, Mishu Riji li de Peng Laozong, (Beijing: Junshi Kexue Chubanshe, 1998, p. 62.) (Commander Peng in the Dairy of His Secretary, Beijing: Military Science Press.) Shen Zhihua, Interview with Wang Yazhi, April-September 2001. (Wang Yazhi was Zhou Enlai's military secretary and Peng Dehuai's Chief of Staff in the 1950s.)
 See Mark Kramer, The Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet Split (1955-1964), Paper for an International Conference: The Cold War in Asia, Hong Kong, Jan. 1996.
 People's Daily, 14 May 1955.
 Mark Kramer, The Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet Split.
 Wang Yan ed., Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p.595. According to Lei Yingfu, Deputy Chief of the War Department of the General Staff, who attended this discussion, this was the first time that the CCP leaders clearly articulated China's strategic guideline.
 Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian Ba Nian, (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao Chubanshe, 1986, p. 13.) (8 Years on the Diplomatic Mission to the Soviet Union, Beijing: CCP Historical Studies Press.)
 Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian Ba Nian, pp. 9-13.
 Vojtech Mastny, NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-1956, Working Paper No. 35, Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Wahington, D.C., March 2002, pp. 79-83. Shen Zhihua ed., Sulian Lishi Dangan Xuanbian, (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2000.) (Selected Soviet Historical Documents, Beijing: China Social Sciences Literature Press.) In Vol.26, published 19 documents related to Soviet disarmament, a few of which reflected the lower level Soviet military's discontent and resistance toward this decision.
 Lei Mindun, Shanghai Shida Lishixi Shijieshi Fanyizu, Huasha Tiaoyue, (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe, 1976, p. 28.) (Remington, Robin Alison, Shanghai Normal University History Department World History Translation Group, trans. Warsaw Pact, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press.) Mastny, NATO in the Beholder's Eye, pp. 81-82.
 Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian 8 Nian, pp. 9-13.
 Zheng Wenhan, Mishu Riji li de Peng Laozong, pp. 61-63.
 Interview with Wang Yazhi.
 People's Daily, 29 January 1956.
 When Mao met with a Japanese communist delegation on 28 March 1966, he said that theSino-Soviet split actually occurred in 1958. Mao said the Soviets wanted to control China's military, but we didn't agree. See Zhang Baijia, "Cong 'Yibiandao' Dao 'Quanfangwei': Dui 50 Nianlai Zhonguo Waijiao Geju Yanjin de Sikao," in Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, issue 1, 2001, p. 24. ( "From 'Leaning to One Side' to 'All Dimension': Rethinking the evolution of the Chinese Diplomatic Pattern in the Last 50 Years" in CCP History Studies.)
 Han Nianlong ed., Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1988, p. 112.) (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press.)
 Peng Dehuai told Ambassador Liu Xiao that some issues were under discussion. Some were Soviet ideas, while some were speculation. See Liu Xiao, Chushi Sulian Ba Nian, pp. 60-61.
 See: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 6-7, winter 1995/1996, Washington, D.C., pp.160-161.
 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi Bian, Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Zhongjuan, (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1997, pp 121-122.) (CCP Documents Research Office ed., The Chronology of Zhou Enlai, middle volume, Beijing: Central Literature Press.)
 1 February 1958, Memoradum of Krutikov's talk with Zhou Enlai, ЦХСД, Contemporary Documents Reserve Center, ф.5, оп.49, д.139, р.8893, лл.10-13.
 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Zhongjuan, pp. 124-125.
 Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok, "Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age," CWIHP Bulletin, 1994 Issue 4, p. 16.
 Halperin, Morton H., "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Morton Halperin ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control, (Cambridge: MIT press, 1967, p. 136.)
 He Lu Xiao Fu Yanlun (January.-April, 1958), Vol. 8, (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1965, p. 522.) (Khrushchev's Political Statements, Beijing: World Knowledge Press.)
 People's Daily, 7 April 1958.
 Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Zhongjuan, pp. 136-137.
 9 May 1958, Memorandum of Antonov's talk with Zhang Wentian, ЦХСД, ф.5, оп.49, д.136, р.8893, лл.77-81.
 28 February 1958, Memorandum of Iudin's talk with Mao Zedong, АВПРФ(Federal Foreign Policy Archives of Russia), ф.0100, п.51, п.432, пор.6, лл.86-96. Details of Khrushchev's talks with Liu Xiao were not revealed in both Chinese and Russian documents.
 9 March 1958, Memorandum of Iudin's talk with Zhu De, АВПРФ,ф.0100,оп.51,п.432,пор.6,лл.97-103. See, В. Зубок, "Переговоры Н.С. Хрущева с Мао Цседуном 31 июля-3 августа 1958 г.," Новая и новейшая история 2001, no. 1, p. 102.
 People's Daily, 26 May 1958.
 See the memoirs of conversations between Mao Zedong and Iudin, 5 April 1958. АВПРФ, ф.0100, оп.51, п.432, пор.6, лл.122-134.
 АВПРФ, ф.0100, оп.51, д.8, п.432, лл .231-233；д.9, п.432, л.80. Б.Т. Кулик, Советско-китайский раскол: Причины и последствия (Мосцов 200), п. 321.
 Xie Heluxiaofu: Daodan Yu Weiji-Erzi Yanzhong de Heluxiaofu, Guo Jiashen deng Fanyi, Beijing: Zhogyang Bianyi Chubanshe, 2002, pp. 164-165; Heluxiaofu: Heluxiaofu Huiyilu. Ma Guifan Fanyi, Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao, Vol. 71, pp. 208-209.
 Xu Mingde, Diyizuo Daxing Chaochangbo Diantai de Jianshe, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Lishi Ziliao Congshu Bianshen Weiyuanhui ed., Haijun Huiyi Shiliao, Beijing: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1999, p. 509.
 Xiao Jinguang, Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), Beijign: Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1988, pp. 200-201.
Wang Yan ed., Peng Dehuai Nianpu, pp. 680-681; Zhongguo Junshi Bowuguan ed., Mao Zedong Junshi Huodong Jishi (1839-1976), Beijing: Jiefangjue Chubanshe, 1994, p. 907.
 Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi ed., "Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, Vol. 7," Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 1992, pp. 265-266.
 Han Nianlong ed., Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao, pp. 112-113; Haijun Huiyi Shiliao ,pp.508-509; Wu Lengxi: Shinian Lunzhan (1956-1966): Zhongsu Guanxi Huiyilu, Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe 1999年, pp. 157-160.
 Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), pp. 175-182.
 Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), pp.183-184; Zhou Enlai Nianpu, Middle Volume, p. 149.
 Nie Rongzhen Zhuanji Bianxiezu: Nie Rongzhen Zhuan, Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994, p.553; Zhou Junlun ed.,: Nie Rongzhen Nianpu, Vol. II, Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1999, pp.643-644.
 See the memoirs of conversations between Mao and Iudin on 21 July 1958, pp. 27-43. Also see Wu Lengxi: Shinian Lunzhan pp. 157-160.
 Weiliexiajin: 1958 Nian 7-8 Yue Heluxiaofu Fangwen Beijing, Chen Chunhua Fanyi, Zhonggong Dangshi Yanjiu, issue 4, 2000, pp. 100-101.
 Waijiaobu, Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi ed,: Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan, Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994, pp. 322-333.
 Weiliexiajin: Heluxiaofu Fangwen Beijing, pp. 101-103. The author checked the full text of the Chinese record and found that Weiliexiajin's recollections are accurate though somewhat simplified.
 Shinian Lunzhan, pp. 160-162. This section was abridged in the literature published in China.
 See the memoirs of the conversations between Mao and Iudin on 22 July 1958.
 Weiliexiajin: Heluxiaofu Fangwen Beijing, p. 103.
 Н.С. Хрущев, Воцпоминания: Избранные фрагменты (Moscow 1997), p. 334; Зубок, "Переговоры,"pp. 101-102; Weiliexiajin: Heluxiaofu Fangwen Beijing, p. 103.
 Weiliexiajin: Heluxiaofu Fangwen Beijing, pp. 103-104.
 Зубок, "Переговоры," p.102.
 People's Daily, 4 August 1958.
 The records of the conversations between Mao and Krushchev on 31 July and 3 August 1958 were from the Private collections of Soviet military historian Dmitrii Volkogonov, collected by the United StatesLibrary of Congress. Volkogonov collected a large amount of literature on Soviet history. According to his testament, the US declassified his collections in 2002. American researcher of National Security Archives V. Zubok compiled and published the two documents. The version in Russian in Новая и новейшая история, 2001, no. 1, pp. 111-128; the version in English is in CWIHP Bulletin, Issues 12-13, Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 250-262.
 Xie. Heluxiaofu: Daodan yu Weiji, pp. 264-165.
 The record of Kulike's speech in the international academic conference on Sino-Soviet relations and The Cold War Conference in Beijing on October 1997. Ding Ming ed., Huigu he Sikao - yu Zhongsu Guanxi Qinlizhe de Duihua, Dangdai Zhonggguo Yanjiu, issue 2, 1998.
 Xie. Heluxiaofu: Daodan yu Weiji, pp.264-165; Heluxiaofu Huiyilu, Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao, Vol 71, pp. 208-209.
 Heluxiaofu Huiyilu, Zhonggong Dangshi Ziliao, Vol 71, pp.209-211. Зубок, "Преговоры," p. 110.
 Ibid., p. 102.
 Ibid., p. 101.
 Haijun Huiyi Shiliao, pp. 509-512; Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), pp.201-202.
 Record of interview with Wang Yazhi; Zheng Wenhan: Mishu Riji li de Peng Laozong, pp. 61-63; Wang Yan ed,Peng Dehuai Nianpu, p. 710.
 Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), p. 181.
 Hou XiangZhi: Yi Er Si Xieding de Qianding, Haijun Huiyi Shiliao, pp.413-415; Xiao Jinguang Huiyilu (Xuji), pp.181-182; Nie Rongzhen Nianpu, Vol II, pp. 665.
 Ao-Tenuoyangnuofusiji: Kuayue Shikong - Sulian Zhuhua Dashi Huiyilu, Xu Kui deng Fanyi, Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1999, pp. 314-315. The author was a member of Khrushchev's retinue when he visited China.
 See Shen Zhihua, Sino-North Korean Conflict and Resolution during the Korean War: A Case Study of Socialist Camp Relations During the Cold War, Kathryn Weathersby ed., which will be published soon; Li Danhui, The Sino-Soviet Dispute over Assistance to Vietnam's Anti-American War(1965-1972), Roberts Priscilla ed., New Evidence on China, Southeast Asia, and the Vietnam War, which will be published soon.